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  ABSTRACT  
A noticeable trend in the Roberts Court’s free speech decisions 
is heightened attention to the dimensions of the First Amendment.  
From holding false factual statements, violent video games, and 
animal cruelty depictions are covered by the First Amendment, to 
determining that a legislator’s vote, the government’s acceptance of a 
monument, and a law school’s refusal to allow access to military 
recruiters are not, the Court has highlighted the importance of 
evaluating both the scope of the First Amendment and the 
appropriate attribution of communicative efforts.  But the Court has 
failed to announce an overarching structural framework for resolving 
these prefatory coverage and attribution issues, instead 
compartmentalizing speech and speaker concerns into separate 
doctrinal strands. 
This Article illustrates the interrelationship of these speech and 
speaker issues and their amenability to a structural framework based 
upon historical traditions and contemporary communicative utility.  
Linguistic communications presumptively fall within First 
Amendment coverage except when historically treated as outside the 
guarantee’s scope or when traditionally viewed as attributable to the 
government or polity.  The presumption, though, is reversed for 
nonlinguistic communicative attempts; founding-era traditions 
indicating the form’s predominant expressiveness are necessary to 
presume coverage.  Yet even communicative efforts outside the First 
Amendment’s presumptive scope may be covered based on 
contemporary insights regarding the expressive value of the 
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RHODES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:09 PM 
396 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:395 
communicative effort when compared to its associated harms. 
The Supreme Court’s doctrine supporting this coverage 
structure reveals both the salience of originalism in determining the 
First Amendment’s baseline scope and the implausibility of a single 
unifying free expression theory.  The fundamental question of First 
Amendment coverage is informed by a combination of historical 
practices and contemporary insights.  These traditions and attitudes 
have not developed from an integrative force, but through our 
nation’s experiences and an ongoing dialectic in which different 
visions of the core purposes of the First Amendment have been 
proposed, debated, and absorbed within the American expressive 
commitment. 
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I.  THE BEDROCK INQUIRIES 
What is speech?  Who is speaking? 
These questions are at the core of the First Amendment.1  Yet 
despite the Roberts Court’s heightened attention to resolving them 
 
 1 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Boundaries] (“[Q]uestions about the involvement of the First Amendment 
in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the issues surrounding 
the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords.”); R. George Wright, 
What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place? Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 
37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (2010) (urging that the “most fundamental question in 
free speech law” is “whether ‘speech,’ for purposes of the First Amendment, is even 
present”). 
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in recent cases, puzzles remain.  Why is a legislator voting “aye” or 
“yes” to a proposition not engaged in First Amendment speech,2 
while a citizen signing a referendum petition or providing a 
campaign contribution to a legislator is?3  Why is the commercial sale 
of the most violent video games First Amendment speech,4 but a law 
school’s refusal to allow or to equalize access to military recruiters on 
campus is not?5  Why is a particularized message required for speech 
coverage in some situations,6 but no discernible message is necessary 
in other situations?7  What allows an individual’s words or utterances 
to be attributed under the First Amendment to the government or 
polity?8 
The Court has not pronounced a structure for resolving these 
puzzles.9  Noted treatises typically compartmentalize speech and 
speaker issues into various sub-strands of First Amendment doctrine 
without acknowledging either their interconnection or their import 
as a prerequisite to constitutional protection.10  Nonetheless, the first 
inquiry in any First Amendment challenge should be whether the 
challenger is engaged in expression covered by the First Amendment, 
which entails examining both the scope of the First Amendment and 
the attribution of the speech.  Only after these questions are 
answered can the challenge be categorized into the appropriate level 
of scrutiny and resolved under the governing standard.11 
This initial coverage determination is challenging, though, 
 
 2 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–51 (2011). 
 3 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817–18 (2010) (referendum petition); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1976) (campaign contributions). 
 4 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–38 (2011).  
 5 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–
66 (2006). 
 6 See, e.g., Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2350; Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 64–66. 
 7 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009); Hurley 
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 8 See, e.g., Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2350; Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 
550, 560–66 (2005). 
 9 Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1767 (highlighting that the question of 
First Amendment coverage is “rarely addressed, and the answer is too often simply 
assumed”). 
 10 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
949–50, 959–60 (4th ed. 2011) (organizing First Amendment materials into various 
sections without a section dedicated to coverage issues); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1252–53 (8th ed. 2010) (same). 
 11 See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 268 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (contending an 
implicit initial issue in every First Amendment case is ascertaining “whether the 
conduct at issue constitutes ‘speech,’” which must be resolved before deciding the 
constitutionality of the government’s action). 
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because the First Amendment’s scope is both broader and narrower 
than the spoken, printed, or written word.  The concept is broader 
because the First Amendment covers forms of nonlinguistic 
communication and conduct, such as marches or burning a flag, 
although not every action that transmits some message qualifies for 
coverage.12  On the other hand, the concept is narrower because 
some words that an individual writes, publishes, or utters are 
considered outside the First Amendment’s scope, including not only 
well-recognized exceptions such as incitement, fighting words, and 
obscenity,13 but also at least some aspects of the law of antitrust, 
employment regulation, professional regulation, and securities 
regulation.14  In addition, even otherwise covered expression is 
sometimes attributed to the government or polity, such as when the 
government funds or controls the message.15 
This Article assembles a First Amendment coverage structure for 
resolving such issues.  Leaving aside further questions regarding the 
appropriate level of scrutiny and the ultimate constitutionality of 
various types of speech regulation,16  I will then sketch the 
implications this speech coverage framework has on First 
Amendment theory. 
The framework I identify depends on two primary 
 
 12 See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of 
“Speech”, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1531–37 (summarizing Supreme Court decisions on 
when such conduct falls within the First Amendment’s scope). 
 13 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). 
 14 See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1768, 1778–84; James Weinstein, 
Participatory  Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 491, 491–92 (2011) [hereinafter Weinstein, Participatory Democracy].  Cf. Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
 15 Cf. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–66 (2005).  
 16 The only constitutional protection afforded to communicative efforts outside 
the First Amendment’s scope is that a government regulation must not (except in 
cases of government speech) discriminate based on any ideas, messages, or 
viewpoints that may be contained in the challenger’s utterance; otherwise, the 
government is free to regulate, restrict, or even ban such utterances.  See, e.g., R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–92 (1992).  In contrast, communicative efforts 
within the First Amendment typically cannot be regulated by the government to 
prevent communicative harms unless the regulation is the only means to serve a 
compelling government objective.  See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination 
Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 236–38 (2012).  The government is allowed, however, to 
regulate First Amendment speech to prevent deleterious effects from its non-
communicative aspects under a lower threshold of scrutiny.  The government also 
has more leeway when either overseeing a restrictive environment (such as the 
military or prisons) or acting in a proprietary capacity as an employer, educator, or 
property owner.  See id. 
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considerations: historical traditions and communicative impact.  The 
first consideration is the historical traditional view of whether the 
communicative effort is within the scope of expressive constitutional 
guarantees.  Linguistic communications are presumptively covered by 
the First Amendment, unless excluded based on an unbroken 
tradition of judicial acquiescence in laws prohibiting or regulating 
that subcategory of communication or of viewing the communication 
as belonging to the government or to the general public.  On the 
other hand, nonlinguistic communications are only entitled to 
presumptive First Amendment status when traditionally treated as 
comparable in expressive value to linguistic communications. 
While all traditionally covered linguistic and nonlinguistic 
communications are within the scope of the First Amendment, the 
second consideration acknowledges that nontraditional forms may 
also fall within the ambit of First Amendment speech, depending on 
contemporary insights regarding the value of the communicative 
effort in light of its associated harms.  This valuation depends on 
balancing the utility of the communicative thought conveyed through 
hearing or sight to a recipient, the harm likely to arise from that 
particular form, and the attribution of the message.17  This allows the 
Court, for example, to find that a traditional linguistic exclusion from 
First Amendment speech, such as defamation, deserves some First 
Amendment coverage,18 and that a nontraditional nonlinguistic form, 
such as a sit-in, is First Amendment speech in certain contexts.19 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II reviews the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine on the First Amendment’s range and displays the 
current methodological consistencies across the various coverage 
issues.  Part III then develops the structural framework I have 
identified and evaluates its normative and analytical utility.  Part IV 
concludes with the insights on First Amendment theory that might be 
gleaned from this structural framework.  The Court’s decisions have 
incorporated original First Amendment practices as a coverage 
baseline, but have supplemented this baseline with contemporary 
valuations of the relative costs and benefits of extending speech 
coverage in light of both the lessons from past American experiences 
and an ongoing public dialogue on our commitment to expressive 
freedom. 
 
 17 Cf. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2008) 
(contending that free-speech “communication occurs when Person A conveys a 
thought to Person B, and Person B freely chooses whether to accept that thought”). 
 18 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268–76 (1964). 
 19 See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion). 
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S SCOPE 
Putting aside the religious liberty guarantees, the First 
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”20  The expressive freedoms thus include speech, press, 
assembly, and petition, although the Court has long emphasized 
“speech” as the paramount guarantee, providing minimal additional 
substantive import to the other separate expressive elements.21 
From a textual perspective, the predominant ordinary meanings 
of “speech,” “press,” and “petition” relate to the spoken, printed, or 
written word, all of which are linguistic forms of communication.22  
This does not mean, of course, that only linguistic communications 
fall within the coverage of the First Amendment; indeed, “the 
right . . . to assemble” is a right to gather together or congregate, 
which does not encompass a predominantly linguistic connotation.23  
Historical evidence also confirms the framers did not intend to 
protect only the spoken, printed, or written word.24  Yet such linguistic 
connotations apparently were the foremost consideration,25 which 
supports separately analyzing linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of 
communication in attempting to ascertain the First Amendment’s 
range.  Moreover, Supreme Court precedent indicates different 
coverage presumptions apply to linguistic and nonlinguistic 
communications. 
 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 21 See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494–98 (2011); 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991). 
 22 “Speech” traditionally has been defined as the utterance of sounds or the 
articulation of words to describe ideas, perceptions, or emotions.  WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2189 (1976) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S THIRD]; 
WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1062 (1848) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER’S AMERICAN].  A traditional definition of “press” is printed or written matter.  
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra, at 1794–95; WEBSTER’S AMERICAN, supra, at 864.  And 
“petition” has typically been defined as a written request to those in authority.  
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra, at 1690; WEBSTER’S AMERICAN, supra, at 820.  All of these are 
predominantly linguistic forms related to language and speech.  
 23  WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 22, at 113; WEBSTER’S AMERICAN, supra note 22, at 
76. 
 24 See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059–63 (2009) [hereinafter Volokh, Symbolic 
Expression]. 
 25 See id. at 1083. 
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A. Presumptive Coverage for Linguistic Communications 
The use of words or language to attempt to communicate any 
assertion, idea, perception, emotion, or thought—or any attempt to 
receive such words or language—is presumptively covered by the First 
Amendment.  Outside specific, judicially defined traditional 
exclusions,26 the Supreme Court’s contemporary decisions have not 
denied First Amendment coverage to any linguistic communicative 
attempt, whether the purpose is to advocate,27 persuade,28 actuate,29 
inform,30 advertise,31 proselytize,32 solicit,33 entertain,34 brag,35 titillate,36 
 
 26 See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2. 
 27 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) (recognizing First Amendment 
right of political candidates and citizens to advocate); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (protecting newspaper advertisement that “communicated 
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and 
sought financial support on behalf of a movement”). 
 28 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011) (explaining 
that “the fear that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it” in 
all but the rarest of circumstances); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(holding First Amendment protects corporate independent expenditures to 
persuade voters). 
 29 See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (“Speech remains protected even when it may 
‘stir people to action . . . .’”) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 
(2010)); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“The claim that 
the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not 
remove them from the reach of the First Amendment.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 537 (1945) (explaining First Amendment “extends to more than abstract 
discussion, unrelated to action” but instead covers “the opportunity to persuade to 
action”). 
 30 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762–66 (1976) (holding First Amendment protects disseminating 
commercial factual information); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391–92 (1962) 
(“The First Amendment envisions that persons be given the opportunity to inform 
the community of both sides of the issue . . . .”). 
 31 See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (“Lawyer 
advertising is in the category of constitutionally protected commercial speech.”); 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) 
(“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
647 (1981) (discussing precedent protecting the expression of religious views); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–10 (1940) (concluding the First 
Amendment prevents the government from “unduly suppress[ing] free 
communication of views, religious or other”). 
 33 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611 
(2003) (“The First Amendment protects the right to engage in charitable 
solicitation.”); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22, 422 n.5 (1988) (holding 
soliciting signatures for a petition involved First Amendment speech); Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (“[C]haritable 
appeals for funds . . . are within the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) 
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embarrass,37 offend,38 disgust,39 shock,40 or address any other “field of 
human interest.”41  And the mode of communication—as long as it is 
has not been traditionally reserved for government purposes42—does 
not matter.  Thus, the Court has held that the First Amendment 
covers not only linguistic communications in historical forms such as 
speeches, newspapers, handbills, leaflets, pamphlets, banners, signs, 
plays, and books,43 but twentieth century forms as well, including the 
 
(“There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment 
protection.”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (holding that the divide 
“between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive” to govern First 
Amendment coverage). 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545–48 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (protecting false claims regarding military awards); id. at 2553–54 (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) 
(concluding sexually oriented programming covered by First Amendment); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853, 874–75 (1997) (holding First Amendment protection 
extended to indecent sexually explicit textual material on the Internet); Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding indecent dial-a-
porn messages covered by the First Amendment). 
 37 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (“Speech 
does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or 
coerce them into action.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723–24 
(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The dominant purpose of the First Amendment 
was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing 
information.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011) (protecting offensive 
funeral picketing inflicting “great pain”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–16 
(2000) (recognizing offensive communications are not outside the First 
Amendment’s scope). 
 39 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) 
(protecting excessively violent video games in part because “disgust is not a valid 
basis for restricting expression”). 
 40 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (acknowledging the 
emotive force of the words “Fuck the Draft” in protecting its display on a jacket). 
 41 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (concluding free speech and press 
rights “are not confined to any field of human interest”). 
 42 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 43 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (applying the First 
Amendment to words on a banner); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (holding that soliciting donations and distributing 
religious literature were within First Amendment’s scope); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. 
Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) (holding “for sale” and “sold” signs 
protected by the First Amendment); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 
557–58 (1975) (holding theater production covered by First Amendment in part 
because “theater usually is that acting out—or singing out—of the written word”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (protecting 
two newspapers from prior restraint); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61–63 
(1970) (recognizing that the First Amendment covers amateur actors in street 
theatrical performances); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) 
(extending First Amendment protection to paid newspaper advertisement); Bantam 
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linguistic components in motion pictures,44 television and radio 
broadcasts,45 cable television,46 the Internet,47 and interactive video 
games.48  All communicative attempts incorporating linguistic 
elements (including sign language, Morse code, or other 
representations of specific words or letters) thus presumptively fall 
within the First Amendment’s scope, with the presumption rebuttable 
only if there is an established tradition of exclusion. 
This is not to say that all linguistic communications 
presumptively receive the same level of First Amendment protection—
rather, only that they are all presumptively covered by and within the scope 
of the First Amendment.  When a linguistic communication is made, 
the presumption is the First Amendment applies, even though the 
rigor of judicial scrutiny may vary depending on such factors as the 
nature of the government regulation, the medium or locale in which 
the communication is made, and the extent to which the 
 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963) (concluding that the First 
Amendment “embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication”); Smith 
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) ( “[P]ublication and dissemination of books 
and other forms of the printed word furnish very familiar applications of . . . 
constitutionally protected freedoms.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532–34 
(1945) (protecting speech urging workers to unionize); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 143 (1943) (protecting door-to-door leaflet distribution); Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108–11 (1943) (protecting door-to-door distribution of 
religious tracts with a request for funds); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) 
(protecting handbill distribution on public streets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 
444, 450–52 (1938) (holding that the First Amendment protected distributing 
pamphlets, leaflets, magazines, and periodicals, which were “historic weapons in the 
defense of liberty”); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 717–20 (1931) 
(protecting an allegedly defamatory newspaper from prior restraint). 
 44 See, e.g., Erznoznik v.  City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975) (protecting 
film projection at drive-in movie theaters); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 
495, 501 (1952) (holding “motion pictures are a significant medium for the 
communication of ideas” covered by the First Amendment). 
 45 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) 
(recognizing First Amendment implications of FCC’s television indecency policy); 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–51 (1978) (holding radio broadcasting 
enjoys limited First Amendment protection).  While these decisions indicate that the 
level of protection for broadcast media is at least currently more limited than it is for 
other modes of communication, television and radio broadcast media are 
nonetheless undoubtedly within the First Amendment’s scope. 
 46 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“Cable 
programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech . . . .”); City of Los 
Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (holding that cable 
television operations communicated messages covered by the First Amendment). 
 47 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–80 (1997) (applying free speech 
principles to the Internet). 
 48 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (holding 
that interactive video games warrant First Amendment coverage because they 
“communicate ideas—and even social messages”). 
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communication entails a matter of public concern.49  Yet the 
presumption for linguistic aspects of communication, irrespective of 
their perceived value,50 is that the First Amendment at least “shows 
up.”51 
Although some early precedents suggested a more limited view,52 
the Supreme Court’s adoption of presumptive First Amendment 
coverage for all (even supposedly worthless) linguistic 
communications is apparent in its recent decisions.  Consider this 
passage from United States v. Stevens: “Most of what we say to one 
another lacks ‘religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, 
historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is still 
sheltered from government regulation.”53  Or this one: “Even 
‘[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free 
speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.’”54  The Court 
has thus acknowledged that a use of words—no matter for what 
purpose—presumptively implicates the First Amendment. 
This is further evidenced by the Court’s prompt extension of 
First Amendment coverage to cable television, the Internet, and 
interactive video games, which all transmit at least some linguistic 
expression, in contrast to the Court’s early twentieth century 
dawdling for motion pictures, which when first introduced did not.55  
The Court in 1915 determined in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission that silent motion pictures were not protected by state 
constitutional expressive guarantees.56  Decades passed before the 
 
 49 Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 949–50, 959–60. 
 50 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“Though we can see 
nothing of any possible value to society in these [true crime] magazines, they are as 
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.”). 
 51 Professor Schauer employed this apt colloquialism in Boundaries, supra note 1, 
at 1767. 
 52 See, e.g., Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 242–44 (1915) 
(concluding that silent motion pictures were not covered under the Ohio 
Constitution as part of “a free press and liberty of opinion” because of their capacity 
for harm, especially to minors), abrogated in part by Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). 
 53 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479 (2010). 
 54 Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (quoting Winters, 333 
U.S. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).  For a thorough and insightful analysis of 
how even nonsense can implicate traditional First Amendment values, see Joseph 
Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment, 
63 DUKE L.J.  (forthcoming 2014). 
 55 See Samantha Barbas, How the Movies Became Speech, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 665, 
672–73 (2012) (noting that early films were “visual novelties” consisting only of 
boxing or dancing footage). 
 56 Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 242–44 (1915). 
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Court reversed course and afforded First Amendment coverage to 
movies in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, with the Court reasoning that 
motion pictures communicated ideas in addition to entertaining and 
that any harms from motion pictures did not require dispensing with 
First Amendment principles.57  Burstyn also highlighted that it was 
“not without significance that talking pictures were first produced in 
1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision,” foreshadowing the 
Court’s modern presumption that communications with linguistic 
elements fall within the First Amendment’s scope.58 
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc. illustrates this 
presumption, with the Court holding after a mere seven sentences of 
reasoning that cable broadcasting “plainly implicates” the First 
Amendment.59  The Court explained that the cable company’s factual 
recitation regarding its business established that, “through original 
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations 
or programs to include in its repertoire, [the company] seeks to 
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide 
variety of formats.”60  The Court next analogized cable television’s 
transmission of speech and ideas to “the traditional enterprises of 
newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and 
pamphleteers.”61  This comparison led the Supreme Court to 
summarily conclude cable television operations fell within the scope 
of the First Amendment, just as wireless broadcasting did.62 
The Court extended First Amendment coverage to the Internet 
in 1997 without any separate analysis at all.  In Reno v. ACLU, after 
recounting in the factual recitation the “wide variety of 
communication and information retrieval methods” on the Internet 
that provide a forum for communication “as diverse as human 
thought,”63 the Court employed First Amendment precedents and 
concepts to review the government regulations at issue without 
independently considering whether the Internet fell within the scope 
of the First Amendment.64  The Court thereby indicated the coverage 
issue was self-evident, warranting no explanation.65 
 
 57 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
 58 Id. at 502 n.12. 
 59 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns. Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 494–95. 
 63 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851–52 (1997). 
 64 Id. at 864–80. 
 65 See id.  While portions of Reno compared and contrasted the Internet to other 
protected mediums of expression, this comparison was not undertaken to ascertain 
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The Court likewise treated First Amendment coverage for 
interactive video games as a largely self-evident proposition in Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Association.66  As a prelude to defending the 
application of strict scrutiny to California’s regulation of violent video 
games, the Court noted that “California correctly acknowledges that 
video games qualify for First Amendment protection.”67  In accord 
with its longstanding precedent that “[t]he line between the 
informing and the entertaining is too elusive” to be the touchstone of 
the First Amendment,68 the Court explained that video games, like 
books, plays and movies, “communicate ideas—and even social 
messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the 
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).”  
That, according to the Court, “suffice[d] to confer First Amendment 
protection.”69  Accordingly, the “basic principles” of the First 
Amendment applied to video games, including exacting judicial 
scrutiny of content-based speech regulations.70 
With interactive video games, then, just like cable television and 
the Internet previously, the Supreme Court applied the First 
Amendment to new media integrating linguistic communications 
with little or no discussion.  This rapid acceptance of new 
technologies, and the Court’s willingness to afford First Amendment 
coverage to any communication conveyed through the written, 
spoken, or printed word, indicate that the First Amendment 
presumptively applies to all linguistic communications in whatever 
form and for whatever purpose.  Only the exceptions to speech 
coverage for linguistic communications necessitate justification; 
otherwise, coverage is presumed.  The use of words—whether 
spoken, printed, or written—should be presumed to be First 
 
First Amendment coverage, but rather the appropriate level of First Amendment 
scrutiny.  The government contended that regulations of the Internet should be 
subject to the lesser scrutiny afforded to broadcast media regulations.  Id. at 868.  
The Court rejected this contention, concluding that the government had not 
licensed the Internet’s creation, the Internet was not as invasive as broadcast media, 
and the Internet was not a scarce expressive commodity.  Id. at 868–70.  Instead, the 
Internet was a “vast democratic forum[]” that combined traditional print and news 
services with interactive platforms for dialogue and other content that allowed users 
to “become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox” and a “pamphleteer” disseminating throughout the world.  Id. at 869–70. 
 66 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 67 Id. at 2733. 
 68 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
 69 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. 
 70 Id. at 2734. 
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Amendment speech, with the presumption rebuttable only in two 
circumstances: (1) the words fall within a so-called “unprotected” 
category, or (2) the words are attributed to the government or polity. 
1.  Categories Outside First Amendment Coverage 
A longstanding limitation on First Amendment coverage is that 
“certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” may be 
prohibited or punished without “rais[ing] any Constitutional 
problem.”71  Linguistic exchanges that fall within one of these 
unprotected classes or categories are outside the normal scope of the 
First Amendment, in a “First Amendment Free Zone.”72  The 
government has free reign to regulate, punish, or prohibit such 
communications, as long as the government does not act as an 
ideological censor based on the ideas, messages, or viewpoints within 
the proscribed category.73 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire furnishes an early illustration of this 
categorical exclusion doctrine.  Chaplinsky’s conviction for deriding 
a city official to his face as a “God damned racketeer” and “damned 
fascist” was upheld on the basis that the government could 
criminalize such “fighting words” as one of those classes of speech 
“which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”74  The government thus did not have to satisfy any type of 
First Amendment judicial scrutiny to have Chaplinsky’s conviction 
upheld for uttering fighting words—such utterances were simply 
outside the First Amendment’s scope. 
The significance of this classification requires careful attention 
to identifying these uncovered categories.  Chaplinsky listed the “the 
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting words.’”75  Subsequent decisions have narrowed the scope of 
some of these traditional categorical exceptions, while also 
recognizing that Chaplinsky’s enumeration was incomplete.76  But a 
 
 71 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 72 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (quoting Bd. of Airport 
Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)).  
 73 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–92 (1992) (holding that, while a 
general prohibition on fighting words would be constitutional, punishing only those 
fighting words based on race, gender, or religion was unconstitutional). 
 74 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (acknowledging 
offers to engage in illegal transactions as unprotected); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343, 359–60 (2003) (recognizing “true threats” as unprotected); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
382–83 (acknowledging the narrowing “of the scope of the traditional categorical 
exceptions for defamation and obscenity”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 
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more fundamental issue than the grouping or listing of these 
uncovered zones is ascertaining the means for their identification. 
Chaplinsky’s evaluation of this issue was cursory.  The Court first 
mentioned that the regulation or prohibition of these “well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech” had “never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem,”77 thereby intimating an approach 
grounded in historical traditions and longstanding judicial 
precedent.  The Court continued, though, that “such utterances are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”78  This language suggested a balancing approach, weighing 
the communicative value of the category of utterances against the 
harm associated with that form of communication.  Chaplinsky’s 
rationale thus foreshadowed two potential methods to identify 
utterances outside the First Amendment’s coverage. 
The dual indication of a historical approach and a cost-benefit 
analysis continued in subsequent Court decisions.  Beauharnais v. 
Illinois relied on both the history and continuing traditions of libel 
laws, as well as reciting the “no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas” conception from Chaplinsky, to hold that defamation was not 
within the First Amendment’s ambit.79  To support its holding that 
obscenity was outside First Amendment coverage, Roth v. United States 
examined founding-era restrictions on blasphemy, profanity, and 
obscenity, along with contemporary indicia of obscenity’s lack of 
“redeeming social importance.”80  The Supreme Court’s holding in 
New York v. Ferber that distributing child pornography was not covered 
by the First Amendment relied on five separate considerations, 
including both the historical understanding that “[i]t rarely has been 
suggested” that First Amendment coverage extends to speech or 
writing that is an integral part of unlawful conduct such as producing 
 
(1982) (holding child pornography unprotected). 
 77 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
 78 Id. at 572.  To support this proposition, the Court cited to ZECHARIAH CHAFEE 
JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149–50 (1941).  Professor Chafee argued that 
obscenity, profanity, blasphemy, and libel were outside the scope of the First 
Amendment, not for historical reasons, but because they “do not form an essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social value as a step toward truth, 
which is clearly outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training of 
the young, and the peace of mind of those who hear and see.”  Id.  
 79 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–57 (1952). 
 80 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1957).  The contemporary 
indications included judicial precedent, international agreements, and state and 
federal obscenity laws.  Id. at 484–85. 
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child pornography,81 and the Court’s ad hoc balancing of “the evil to 
be restricted [that] so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interests . . . at stake.”82  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul likewise 
acknowledged both the longstanding historical exclusion of these 
types of utterances from First Amendment coverage and their limited 
social utility in comparison to their deleterious impact.83 
Relying on such repeated references to speech valuation, the 
government in United States v. Stevens contended that visual and 
auditory depictions of animal cruelty constituted another categorical 
exclusion from First Amendment coverage because the worth of such 
depictions was minimal compared to their societal cost.84  But in 
Stevens, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected a simple balancing 
test as the touchstone of First Amendment coverage, describing it as a 
“startling and dangerous” proposition.85  The First Amendment itself, 
according to the Court, was the American people’s balance of the 
social costs and benefits of free speech, foreclosing “any attempt to 
revise that judgment on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”86 
While acknowledging that its prior opinions had “described 
historically unprotected categories of speech” as of de minimis worth 
when compared to their societal toll, the Court maintained that such 
statements were only “descriptive” and did not “set forth a test that 
may be applied as a general matter to permit the Government to 
imprison any speaker as long as his speech is deemed valueless or 
unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits 
tilts in a statute’s favor.”87  Instead, the Court predicated the 
 
 81 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (quoting Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)). 
 82 Id. at 763–64.  The Court’s other complementary rationales included the 
compelling state interest in safeguarding children from physical and psychological 
harms, the connection between the distribution of child pornography and sexual 
abuse of children, and the minuscule value of such materials.  Id. at 757–64. 
 83 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“From 1791 to the 
present, however, our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the content of 
speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.’” (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)). 
 84 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–70 (2010).  Stevens sold dog fight 
videos in violation of a federal statute that criminalized the commercial creation, 
sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty.  Id. at 463–69.  He 
challenged his conviction on free speech grounds, with the government arguing that 
such depictions were “categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 
467–69. 
 85 Id. at 469–71. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 469–72. 
RHODES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:09 PM 
410 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:395 
recognition of categories of unprotected speech on a historical 
approach: a longstanding and ongoing tradition dating to the 
founding of excluding the utterances from First Amendment 
coverage.88  Because no First Amendment tradition prohibited 
portrayals of animal cruelty (even though the underlying acts of 
cruelty have long been outlawed), depictions of animal cruelty were 
not one of those communicative efforts—like obscenity, fraud, or 
incitement—outside the First Amendment’s reach.89 
Although Stevens correctly required a showing of a longstanding 
historical tradition to support a categorical exclusion from the First 
Amendment’s coverage, the Court’s offhand remark downplaying the 
balancing approach as merely “descriptive” contravened its earlier 
precedents.  Chaplinsky, after discussing the costs and benefits of 
fighting words and other categories of uncovered utterances, cited to 
Professor Chafee’s Free Speech in the United States, which contended 
that the exclusions from First Amendment coverage depended on the 
value of the communication at issue in comparison to its impact on 
the social order.90  And the Ferber Court, while mentioning as one of 
five considerations the speech integral to criminal conduct historical 
exception, emphasized to a greater degree that “the evil to be 
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if 
any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is 
required.”91  Under no fair reading of these cases can the balancing 
discussion be accurately described as merely “descriptive.” 
Nonetheless, Stevens’s consequential insight that the Court’s 
prior opinions did not support “a simple cost-benefit analysis” as the 
touchstone of First Amendment coverage is undeniable.92  While cost-
benefit balancing was conducted in Chaplinsky and Ferber, their 
analyses also incorporated at least a passing allusion to historical 
exclusions as well.  Roth and Beauharnais expatiated at length on 
founding-era restrictions in holding that obscenity and libel were 
outside the scope of the First Amendment, with comparative value 
 
 88 See id. at 469, 472. 
 89 Id. at 469–72. 
 90 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.4 (1942) (citing ZECHARIAH 
CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149–50 (1941)). 
 91 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–64 (1982).  Ferber also nowhere discussed 
a need to ground a new unprotected speech category into a pre-existing category 
with a longstanding tradition of exclusion.  Id.  As Professor Strossen noted, Stevens 
was thus a “novel” recasting of Ferber.  Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: 
Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2009–10 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 67, 84–85. 
 92 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (emphasis added). 
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receiving relatively short shrift.93  The Court’s precedents before 
Stevens supported both a historical approach and a balancing 
approach—not one to the exclusion of the other. 
These precedents thus confirm the holdings in Stevens and 
subsequent cases that categorical exclusions from First Amendment 
coverage require a longstanding historical tradition.94  But while such 
a tradition is a necessary condition of exclusion, it is not by itself 
sufficient.  History alone cannot justify the First Amendment’s 
contemporary scope.  Current protections for profanity and 
blasphemy were not contemplated as part of free expression at the 
founding, nor were the modern protections afforded to defamation 
and incitement.  The Supreme Court’s twentieth century 
circumscriptions of founding practices regarding unprotected 
expression demonstrate that categorical exclusions necessitate both a 
longstanding historical tradition and a continued contemporary 
perspective that the harms associated with that type of utterance 
exceed its relative benefits.  While the Court cannot augment the 
historic categorical exclusions, it may narrow or even eliminate them 
under contemporary evaluations of their continued propriety. 
Profanity proscriptions are illustrative.  The original states 
enforced norms of respect and propriety regarding public 
discourse—criminalizing public profanity, blasphemy, or both.95  
Such laws were considered constitutional despite state constitutional 
free speech protections,96 and were still prevalent—and regarded as 
enforceable—from the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 93 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–85 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
U.S. 250, 254–57 (1952). 
 94 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–47 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (relying on Stevens to reject the government’s assertion that false statements 
fell outside the First Amendment’s coverage); Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. 
Ct. 2729, 2734–35 (2011) (following Stevens to hold that violent video games were not 
outside the First Amendment); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–72. 
 95 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 482 n.12 (listing founding-era state statutory provisions 
regarding profanity and blasphemy); LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE 
AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 400–23 (1995) (discussing 
American state blasphemy laws and prosecutions during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries). 
 96 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 220–21 (1838) (holding 
blasphemy statute did not violate state constitution); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 
11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 399–408 (Pa. 1824) (upholding blasphemy statute against 
constitutional challenge while reversing conviction on other grounds); cf. State v. 
Chandler, 2 Del. 553 (1837) (upholding state statute criminalizing blasphemy against 
constitutional challenges based on religious freedoms); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 
290, 294–96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (holding that blasphemous and profane 
disparagements of Christianity were common law offenses despite state constitutional 
protections of religious freedom). 
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into the twentieth century.97  In 1942, Chaplinsky even listed “the 
profane” as one of the classes of utterances outside the First 
Amendment’s scope.98  But profanity’s categorical exclusion from the 
First Amendment is no more.  Not one of the Court’s opinions over 
the last half a century has mentioned profane utterances as 
uncovered by the First Amendment.99  Rather, profanity today is often 
protected from government sanctions.100  Cohen v. California famously 
held that the government could not criminalize the public display of 
the word “Fuck” on a jacket.101  In doing so, the Court emphasized 
speech’s import in the American political system, which necessitated 
governmental regulatory forbearance regarding almost all forms of 
individual expression, unless necessary for undeniable government 
 
 97 See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (stating in dicta that 
the constitutional guarantee of free expression did not “permit the publication of 
libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public 
morals or private reputation”); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 422, 471–76 (1st ed. 1868) (discussing profanity and 
blasphemy laws as comporting with constitutional precepts of free speech and 
religious liberty). 
 98 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  Chaplinsky did not list 
the blasphemous, though, as uncovered speech, presumably because the Court’s 
decision two years earlier in Cantwell v. Connecticut indicated that characterizing 
speech as blasphemous did not remove First Amendment protection.  310 U.S. 296, 
305 (1940).  Cantwell’s conviction for breaching the peace by playing a record to two 
men that attacked all organized religions as the work of Satan was reversed because 
the government “may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or 
other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.”  Id. at 308–09.  Any 
lingering doubt on the constitutionality of blasphemy statutes was dispelled by Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, which held that, under free speech and press principles, “the 
state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful 
to them.” 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). 
 99 This contention only appears in dissents quoting Chaplinsky.  See, e.g., Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 385 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Lewis v. City of New 
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Papish v. Bd. of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 676 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Rosenfeld v. New 
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 100 See, e.g, Lewis, 415 U.S. at 133–34 (invalidating a state statute prohibiting 
cursing, reviling, or opprobrious language towards a police officer); Papish, 410 U.S. 
at 667–70 (protecting on-campus distribution of a newspaper with “Mother Fucker” 
in an article title); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23–26 (1971) (protecting a 
display of “Fuck the Draft” on jacket).  This does not mean, of course, that profanity 
is immune from government regulation, especially in certain contexts involving 
minors.  See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–86 (1986) 
(upholding sanction for student’s vulgar assembly speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found, 
438 U.S. 726, 748–50 (1978) (upholding sanction for “filthy” radio broadcast). 
 101 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23–26. 
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interests.102  The government’s claimed concern with propriety and 
respect was simply insufficient, according to Cohen, to justify 
interfering with the open debate vital to our society.103  The choice of 
linguistic expression encompasses not only ideas but also emotions, 
with words frequently chosen “as much for their emotive as their 
cognitive force.”104  These contemporary insights regarding the 
emotive force of even vulgar language now prohibit profanity’s 
criminalization, despite the contrary practices at the founding.  Only 
those profane utterances that meet another categorical exception—
such as “fighting words” in a face-to-face exchange in circumstances 
that would cause the average addressee to respond violently and 
breach the peace—are now outside the First Amendment’s scope.105 
A similar desirable progression occurred for defamation.  The 
original founding states prosecuted libels, without considering such 
prosecutions as inconsistent with state constitutional or natural law 
principles of free speech.106  Throughout the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth, the judiciary continued to view state expressive 
guarantees as not undermining the common-law and statutory 
doctrines subjecting libels to criminal and civil sanction.107  Based on 
this ongoing historical tradition, Beauharnais held in 1952 that 
 
 102 Id. at 24–25. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 26. 
 105 Id. at 20, 23–26; accord Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132–34; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 
518, 528 (1972).  While Chaplinsky held that epithets hurled at a city marshal such as 
“God damned racketeer” and “damned Fascist” were fighting words, even though 
under the presented circumstances there was no reasonable likelihood of an actual 
breach of the peace, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have clarified that 
fighting words require a likelihood, under the presented circumstances, that “the 
person addressed would make an immediate violent response.”  Gooding, 405 U.S. at 
528. 
 106 In some states, the state constitution’s expressive guarantee specifically 
authorized prosecuting libels and then detailed defenses, evidentiary rules, and 
appropriate jury determinations.  See, e.g., Del. Const. of 1792 art. I, § 5; Pa. Const. of 
1790 art. IX, § 7; R.I. Const. of 1842 art. I, § 20.  In other states, founding era state 
judicial decisions established that libel prosecutions did not violate free speech 
principles.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313 (1825) (holding 
state constitutional press guarantee did not abrogate indictments for criminal libel); 
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 391–94 (N.Y. 1804) (Kent, J.) (concluding that 
liberty of press authorized evidence regarding the truth but did not protect false 
libelous statements); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811) (affirming criminal 
conviction for libel).  Such prosecutions were authorized by the criminal statutes or 
the common law of almost all the original states.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 482 n.11 (1957) (listing provisions). 
 107 See COOLEY, supra note 97, at 420–26 (maintaining that constitutional speech 
and press liberties did not preclude civil and criminal punishment for common law 
libels). 
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libelous utterances were outside “the area of constitutionally 
protected speech.”108  Nevertheless, twelve years later, in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court reversed course and proclaimed that 
“libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional 
limitations.”109  Sullivan emphasized the First Amendment’s 
overarching aspiration to ensure the government’s responsiveness to 
the people through “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate and 
the unfettered exchange of ideas.110  In light of this aspiration, even 
erroneous or defamatory statements about public officials cannot be 
wholly withdrawn from the First Amendment’s scope without 
squelching the “breathing room” essential to a frank, unrestrained, 
and vigorous civic discourse.111  The Court has accordingly developed, 
in Sullivan and its progeny, a complex set of constitutional 
protections for defamatory utterances that safeguard all but the truly 
malicious contributions to the public debate while preserving 
reputational interests (especially those of private citizens) to the 
extent possible.112  Further discussion of these newfound constraints 
on traditional libel sanctions is not necessary to the lesson from their 
very existence—based on contemporary insights regarding the need 
to protect even false and defamatory statements to achieve the First 
Amendment’s fundamental objectives, constitutional coverage was 
extended to a historical categorical exclusion. 
The same lesson is evident from the narrowing of the categorical 
exclusion for obscenity.  While statutory provisions against and 
common law prosecutions of obscenity were absent in the first few 
decades following American independence,113 by 1815 American 
courts began to recognize the English common law crime for morally 
corruptive exhibitions or publications of obscene and indecent 
materials.114  The states and the federal government soon thereafter 
introduced distinct statutory crimes for publishing sexual materials,115 
 
 108 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–57, 266 (1952).  The Court noted 
that every American jurisdiction at the time criminalized libels directed at 
individuals.  Id. at 255 n.5. 
 109 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
 110 Id. at 269–70. 
 111 Id. at 271–73. 
 112 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 1078–79. 
 113 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1857, 1863 (2007) [hereinafter Stone, Sex]. 
 114 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336, 337 (1821) (upholding 
common law prosecution against publisher of “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure”); 
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815) (upholding common law 
prosecution against exhibitor of pornographic drawings). 
 115 See, e.g., Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); Tariff Act, ch. 270, § 28, 5 
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with twenty of the then-existing thirty-five states enacting prohibitions 
on publishing or circulating obscene materials by the Civil War’s 
conclusion.116  Courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
not only failed to mention any constitutional difficulty with these 
statutes,117 but also upheld convictions under them based solely on 
whether an isolated excerpt from the work could deprave and 
corrupt those susceptible to immoral influences.118  But despite the 
Supreme Court’s continued adherence today to a categorical 
exclusion for obscenity, the breadth of the obscenity exception has 
been narrowed significantly from these earlier cases. 
Modern precedents demand that a work is only obscene if it 
contains patently offensive depictions or descriptions of specifically 
defined sexual conduct, appeals in its entirety to the prurient interest 
in sex under contemporary community standards as adjudged by the 
average person, and lacks serious artistic, literary, political, or 
scientific value when viewed in its entirety.119  This standard prevents 
materials from being categorically excluded from First Amendment 
coverage simply because some passage or depiction might deprave 
the morals of a particularly susceptible individual, as was the case in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Today, even works 
depicting patently offensive sexual conduct proscribed by law are 
covered by the First Amendment, unless the government establishes 
both that the work appeals to a “shameful” or “morbid” interest in 
sex,120 and that the reasonable person would find that the work has no 
serious value.121  In this manner, obscenity now partially depends 
upon the potential societal harms from, and the redeeming value of, 
 
Stat. 548, 566 (1842); Act of May, 1821, ch. 22, § 69, Conn. Stat. Laws 165; Act of 
Nov. 15, 1821, ch. 12, § 23, Laws of Vt. 271. 
 116 See Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-
Century United States, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369, 384 (2002). 
 117 See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134–35 (1892) (indicating that circulating 
obscene books and papers does not fall within freedom of communication); Ex parte 
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1878) (upholding the Comstock Act, which prohibited 
the transportation through the mail of various immoral items, against First 
Amendment challenge). 
 118 See, e.g., MacFadden v. United States, 165 F. 51, 52 (3d Cir. 1908) (affirming an 
obscenity conviction despite portions of the magazine being unobjectionable); 
United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.) (reluctantly 
refusing to dismiss an indictment under binding precedent as some isolated parts of 
the book might have a corrupting influence); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 
1093, 1103–05 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (finding no error in an obscenity jury charge 
focusing on tendency to suggest impure thoughts to susceptible individuals). 
 119 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973). 
 120 See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985). 
 121 See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). 
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the work. 
The exclusion for advocating illegal activity has also been 
appropriately narrowed based on contemporary understandings of its 
societal benefits and harms.  Seditious utterances were prosecuted as 
criminal offenses under founding-era state common law, 
notwithstanding state constitutional free expression guarantees.122  
While the federal government’s authority to prosecute seditious libel 
was vigorously contested in America’s formative years due to the 
Constitution’s enumeration of limited federal powers and the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on congressional speech legislation, many 
of those challenging the Sedition Act of 1798 acknowledged the 
constitutionality of state sedition prosecutions.123  Moreover, not only 
were seditious communications punished, but, as a general rule, any 
communicative attempt that had a “bad tendency” to cause crime, 
disorder, or immoral acts could be punished,124 a view which 
continued until early in the twentieth century.125  But in the mid-
 
 122 See, e.g., David J. Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious 
Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 171–78 (2001) 
(describing common law prosecutions for seditious libel in Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, and Virginia, despite state constitutional press guarantees); JAMES 
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 2:13-22 (1826) (recognizing that defamatory 
publications against the government were punishable both by the civil and criminal 
law).  But see COOLEY, supra note 97, at 429–30 (urging English common-law rule on 
seditious libel was not adopted by the states). 
 123 See, e.g., 2 Annals of Cong. 2106 (statement of Representative Macon) (arguing 
against the Sedition Act because “persons might be prosecuted for a libel under the 
State Governments”); Ky. Resolutions ¶ 3 (Nov. 1798) (urging the states retain “the 
right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be 
abridged.”).  See also LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 307–08 (1985) 
(opining that the Jeffersonians, while objecting to a sedition act by the national 
government, did not object to similar restrictions imposed by the states).  Accord 
Jenkins, supra note 122, at 180 (noting that the opponents of the Sedition Act “were 
primarily concerned with preserving states’ rights and, therefore, failed to discredit 
the underlying principles of common-law seditious libel”). 
 124 See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 10–12 (2000).  The 
origins of the “bad tendency” test are traceable to Blackstone, who urged that the 
state could punish “dangerous or offensive writings” with a “pernicious tendency” 
against good order.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” Test: Free 
Speech in Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 432–33. 
 125 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (holding the state 
could constitutionally punish those “utterances inimical to the public welfare, 
tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of 
organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means”), overruled by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 
(1915) (upholding a conviction for publishing an article encouraging a boycott 
against those harassing nudists on the basis that the article encouraged and incited 
“a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure”); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 
279, 294 (1904) (upholding the deportation of an alien on basis of anarchist views 
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twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to recognize a 
distinction between the “mere abstract teaching” of the need for 
lawlessness or violence and the actual preparing or exhorting of a 
group into violent or unlawful action.126  Brandenburg v. Ohio held that 
the government could not “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
produce such action.”127  Brandenburg’s holding, rendering such 
advocacy unprotected only in the face of the dire societal costs arising 
from imminent lawlessness, at least implicitly acknowledged the value 
of expression advocating unlawful activities or civil disobedience, 
which is, of course, a uniquely powerful communicative message.  
Based on its contemporary understanding of the benefits and costs of 
such advocacy, the Supreme Court thus narrowed the historical scope 
of this exclusion, just as it did for the fighting words, defamation, and 
obscenity exclusions. 
A more in-depth evaluation would uncover an analogous 
progression in other excluded speech categories, but my purpose 
here is not to provide a full historical treatment of all the categories 
outside the First Amendment’s coverage, nor even to mark their 
present boundaries with precision, matters deserving their own 
separate treatment.  Rather, my aims are to illustrate the modern 
judicial constriction of the founding-era scope of utterances outside 
constitutional expressive protections and to demonstrate that this 
expansion of First Amendment coverage depended on contemporary 
perspectives regarding the utility of such communications balanced 
against their societal costs.  This progressive expansion confirms that, 
while a historical tradition is a necessary component of unprotected 
speech categories, it is not sufficient.  The lessons learned and 
knowledge gained from the ongoing American experience may 
propel the judiciary to extend First Amendment coverage to 
historically uncovered expressive messages. 
A linguistic communication thus falls within the First 
Amendment’s scope unless excluded by both a longstanding, 
ongoing historical tradition and the judiciary’s contemporary 
valuation of relative benefits and costs, or unless, as discussed below, 
the communication is attributed, for First Amendment purposes, to 
 
against First Amendment challenge because “he contemplated the ultimate 
realization of his ideal by the use of force or . . . his speeches were incitements to that 
end”  having a dangerous “tendency”). 
 126 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (citing prior cases). 
 127 Id. at 447. 
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the government or the polity. 
2.  Government Speech and Other Attributions 
First Amendment coverage typically extends beyond expression’s 
originators to encompass publishers, distributors, disseminators, and 
even audiences.128  But a significant exception is that no private 
individual or entity can seek protection under the First Amendment 
when the speech at issue is attributed to the government or polity.129 
Unlike the categories of unprotected speech discussed in the 
previous subsection, however, this exclusion has not been fully 
integrated into Supreme Court doctrine.  The Court’s approach to 
date has been piecemeal, resolving the presented issues in each case 
with undertheorized conclusions.  Decisions during the last decade 
are illustrative.  The Court, without identifying or proposing any 
unifying framework, held in separate cases that a legislator does not 
exercise a personal First Amendment right when casting an official 
vote,130 that a private group is not covered by the First Amendment 
when requesting placement of a permanent monument in a city park 
with other donated monuments,131 and that beef producers are not 
covered by the First Amendment when objecting to compelled 
assessments for disfavored government-sponsored promotional 
advertising.132 
Yet such exclusions from the First Amendment’s scope are too 
consequential to entrust to these offhanded appraisals.  The Court in 
these cases denied any First Amendment coverage.  These denials 
implicate the same concerns underlying Stevens’s rejection of a 
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside 
the scope of the First Amendment.”133  Just as the First Amendment 
forecloses creating new categorical exclusions “simply on the basis 
that some speech is not worth it,”134 government immunity from First 
Amendment challenges should not be based solely on ad hoc judicial 
judgments regarding attributing expression.  This is especially true 
because the consequences of an imputed exclusion often exceed 
 
 128 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (recognizing First 
Amendment coverage for distribution and receipt of expression); Lovell v. City of 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (holding that the First Amendment covers 
distribution as well as publication). 
 129 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–66 (2005). 
 130 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–51 (2011). 
 131 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009). 
 132 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62. 
 133 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). 
 134 Id. at 1585. 
RHODES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:09 PM 
2014] THE FIRST AMENDMENT STRUCTURE 419 
those of a categorical exclusion, as the government may not regulate 
a categorical exclusion based on the idea, viewpoint, or message 
expressed,135 while such discrimination is typically permitted when 
speech is attributed to the government.136  Since the ramifications are 
at least as severe, if not more so, than for a categorical exclusion, 
governmental attribution should require circumstances analogous to 
those warranting a categorical exclusion.  A speaker should thus only 
be denied First Amendment coverage for linguistic communications 
in situations corresponding with historical traditions and continued 
contemporary insights regarding the appropriate attribution of the 
communication in light of the communicative interests at stake and 
the availability of alternative channels of communication. 
This structure reconciles the Supreme Court’s holdings and 
integrates aspects of its decisional rationales.  Take Nevada Commission 
on Ethics v. Carrigan, which held that legislative recusal rules are not 
subject to First Amendment challenge because a legislative vote is not 
a personal expressive right of a legislator.137  In reaching this holding, 
the Court first highlighted that courts had not previously invalidated 
any generally applicable legislative recusal rules despite their 
widespread use in America since the founding.138  This tradition 
established, according to the Court, that recusal rules do not touch 
upon covered First Amendment speech “because such laws existed in 
1791 and have been in place ever since.”139  The Court viewed this 
historical tradition as comporting with the principle that a legislative 
vote is an apportionment of legislative power from the people rather 
than the expression of an individual legislator.140  In regards to its 
expressive value, the Court reasoned, a legislative vote “symbolizes 
nothing.  It discloses . . . that the legislator wishes (for whatever 
reason) that the proposition on the floor be adopted, just as a 
physical assault discloses that the attacker dislikes the victim.  But 
neither the one nor the other is an act of communication.”141  Plus, 
 
 135 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992). 
 136 See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68.  
 137 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2011). 
 138 Id. at 2347–48.  The House of Representatives adopted its legislative recusal 
rule on April 7, 1789, 1 Annals of Cong. 98–99 (1789), and the Senate adopted its 
rule in 1801. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE 
OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1801).  The Court also detailed that the 
states likewise had a longstanding tradition of recusal rules.  Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 
2349. 
 139 Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348. 
 140 Id. at 2350. 
 141 Id. 
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the Court continued, even when a personal message exists, the 
legislator has no First Amendment right to use the government 
mechanics of voting to convey it.142  Carrigan thereby evaluated 
historical traditions, the utterance’s ascribed source, and the 
communicative interests at stake in holding that the typically 
linguistic act of legislative voting was not First Amendment covered 
expression attributable to a legislator. 
Carrigan’s solitary shortcoming was describing legislative voting 
as a “nonsymbolic act” or “nonsymbolic conduct,”143 rather than 
viewing the frequently linguistic element involved—stating “aye” or 
“nay” or recording an “aye” or “nay” in the printed records—as 
implicating “speech.”144  The potential pitfalls of dismissing spoken or 
printed words as merely “conduct” are well documented.145  Carrigan 
had no need to navigate this perilous terrain; indeed, the Court’s 
foray leaves troublesome issues regarding expressive coverage for 
other types of voting or linguistic utterances with legislative 
consequences.146  A preferable approach would have been to begin 
with the presumptive First Amendment coverage for linguistic 
communications, but then exclude legislative voting based on both 
 
 142 Id. at 2351. 
 143 Id. at 2350–51. 
 144 See id. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court’s strange understanding of 
the concept of speech is shown by its suggestion that the symbolic act of burning the 
flag is speech but John Quincy Adams calling out ‘yea’ on the Embargo Act was 
not.”). 
 145 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 881, 906 (“[S]imply labeling speech ‘conduct’ is an analytical nonstarter.”); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 110 (1989) (arguing attempt to distinguish 
between speech and conduct is “doomed to failure”); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a 
Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1978) (viewing the survival of the 
“empty speech-conduct distinction . . . in a world without extrasensory 
communication” as a “mystery”); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free 
Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107, 114 (1982) (urging “one should not take recourse 
to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is ‘speech-brigaded-with-action’ or ‘conduct’ alone 
that is curtailed” when a verbal utterance is regulated); Eugene Volokh, Speech as 
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering 
Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1284–85, 1347–48 
(2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech as Conduct] (arguing that speech as conduct 
doctrines “require courts to focus on the wrong questions, and would often lead 
courts . . . to reach the wrong results”).  But see KENT GREENWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND 
THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57–58 (1989) (maintaining that limited kinds of speech 
involve “situation-altering utterances” not covered by the First Amendment). 
 146 See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring).  Such issues, though, may 
not be troubling to Carrigan’s author, Justice Scalia, who believes that linguistic 
legislative acts are not covered by the First Amendment.  See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811, 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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(1) the ongoing historical tradition of attributing the legislative 
power to the constituency and (2) the contemporary understandings 
that the communicative aspect of a vote is minimal to both the 
legislator and the intended audience and that ample alternative 
methods exist to convey any desired message. 
A similar analysis also harmonizes the Court’s government 
speech cases.  The current doctrinal significance of government 
speech is not creating a free speech right that the government can 
assert against itself,147 but instead providing the government a defense 
to a First Amendment claim when the particular forum or 
communicative avenue a person is attempting to access has been 
reserved for the government’s use.148  In other words, the government 
speech doctrine treats a specified communicative forum as reserved 
for the government’s transmission of messages, precluding the 
putative speaker from employing that channel to transmit speech that 
would otherwise fall within the First Amendment.  And while the 
Court has been obtuse in defining the contours of government 
speech other than discussing the need for government control,149 the 
decisions often highlight both historical traditions and the interests 
of speakers and audiences. 
Consider Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, which held that the 
government could choose to accept or reject privately donated 
permanent monuments for exhibition in a public park without any 
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.150  This result effectively 
 
 147 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government 
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1501–08 (2001) (detailing the textual, historical, and 
prudential arguments against the government being a First Amendment rights 
holder).  But see David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1637, 1640–41 (2006) (contending that in some situations a public entity should 
have constitutional protection for its speech). 
 148 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and 
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 956 (1998) (highlighting 
that the government’s own speech may limit the freedom of others to speak under 
the idea of a “government speech forum”); Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and 
Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 708 (2011) [hereinafter Blocher, Viewpoint 
Neutrality] (“[G]overnment speech doctrine provides a defense to First Amendment 
challenges brought by private individuals whose speech has been limited by the 
government”). 
 149 See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (contending that the Court’s government speech doctrine is “relatively 
new, and correspondingly imprecise”). 
 150 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).  The rejected 
monument was a stone inscribed with the tenets of the Summum religion, the Seven 
Aphorisms of Summum.  Id. at 465.  Because the linguistic elements in the 
monument served an essential expressive purpose, this monument can be classified 
as linguistic, even though many monuments are nonlinguistic.  See infra Part II.B. 
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grants public officials unfettered discretion to display only those 
monuments comporting with their preferences and favored themes 
(unless doing so violates another constitutional prohibition, such as 
the Establishment Clause).  To support its holding, the Court began 
with the longstanding practice, dating back to ancient times, of 
governments expressing messages or beliefs through monuments.151  
Throughout American history, government entities have selectively 
received and exhibited thousands of privately funded or donated 
monuments, while retaining editorial control over their content and 
public display.152  The city in this case had exercised such selective 
control, accepting only those privately donated monuments 
comporting with the image it desired to project.153  As a result, the 
Court determined that the city had “‘effectively controlled’ the 
messages conveyed by the monuments in the park by exercising ‘final 
approval authority’ over their selection.”154 
In the course of this discussion, the Court highlighted several 
additional considerations.  Observers, the Court reasoned, 
“routinely” and “reasonably” interpret monuments as expressing a 
message on behalf of a property owner (whether private or public), 
indicating that the property owner is viewed as “speaking” through 
the monument.155  The Court further noticed the financial benefit the 
government (and its citizens) obtain by accepting privately funded or 
donated monuments rather than relying on public financing,156 as 
well as the practical necessity for government selectivity to avert a 
“monumental” inundation of public property.157  And the city’s 
regulation at issue was limited to this need, the Court observed, 
without inhibiting other protected expressive activities in the park.158 
These considerations fit comfortably within a framework based 
on historical traditions and contemporary communicative impact.  
An ongoing historical tradition exists of governments selectively 
choosing monuments to display on public property, a tradition never 
successfully challenged on free speech grounds.  The historical 
 
 151 Summum, 555 U.S. at 470. 
 152 Id. at 471–72. 
 153 Id. at 472–73.  The city had also established criteria for future selections of 
monuments and obtained ownership of most of the monuments in the park.  Id. 
 154 Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61). 
 155 Id. at 471. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 479–80. 
 158 Id. at 474 (“And the City has made no effort to abridge the traditional free 
speech rights—the right to speak, distribute leaflets, etc.—that may be exercised by 
respondent and others in Pioneer Park.”). 
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understanding that the government is “speaking” when the 
monument is on public property comports with the contemporary 
perspectives of the modern observer and the government’s need to 
manage public property while being able to continue this time-
honored form of government expression.  Public property cannot 
provide a forum for the permanent display of every privately donated 
monument.159  And speakers, such as the Summum, have numerous 
other methods to transmit their expression to their intended 
audiences without employing this traditionally exclusive government 
forum.  Summum’s holding that the public display of privately 
donated monuments is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny thus 
corresponds with historical traditions and continued contemporary 
insights regarding the appropriate attribution of the monument’s 
expression in light of the communicative interests at stake and the 
availability of alternative channels of communication. 
Summum’s stated rationale, however, also emphasized a 
problematic construct.  While the Court acknowledged the 
“legitimate concern” that the government speech doctrine should not 
be employed “as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers 
over others based on viewpoint,” its focus on the government’s 
control of the message did nothing to alleviate it.160  An ad hoc 
judgment regarding the government’s “control” over a particular 
message is no more constraining than an ad hoc judgment on the 
value of speech in light of its associated harms.161  If control is the 
only criterion, why couldn’t the government assert the necessary 
control over public libraries to remove materials based on 
viewpoint,162 over public broadcasting stations to ban editorializing,163 
over public university student groups to bar any objectionable 
 
 159 Cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 811 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting the battle over symbols when the capitol 
grounds in Ohio were opened to temporary monuments during the holiday season). 
 160 Summum, 555 U.S. at 472–73.  While I agree with Professor Blocher that the 
government speech doctrine by its very nature “encourages government to be open, 
consistent, and sincere” in favoring certain private speakers over others, I view the 
Court’s expressed concern as focused on the doctrine’s scope.  See Blocher, supra 
note 148 at 717. 
 161 See United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 469–72 (2010). 
 162 But see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–72 (1982) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that books could not be removed from a school library due to partisan 
or ideological ideas). 
 163 But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–401 (1984) 
(holding ban on editorializing on publicly funded television stations 
unconstitutional). 
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perspectives,164 over public university professors to prohibit 
unorthodox viewpoints,165 over government-funded attorneys to 
preclude specified arguments from being presented in court,166 or 
over nongovernmental organizations participating in a federal 
program to compel their pledges to support government policies?167  
Indeed, as the government stressed in Summum, control as the 
criterion would generally authorize the government, once it “takes 
control of something, says this is our speech,” to be immune from 
judicial scrutiny because “then it’s the Government speaking.”168 
Yet a needed constraint would exist by further limiting the 
government speech doctrine to traditional situations in which the 
government has expressed itself without providing an opportunity for 
contrary viewpoints.  This historical prerequisite would preclude the 
government from attempting to assert control over existing mediums 
of communication to immunize itself from compliance with First 
Amendment limitations.169  Government speech, then, could not be 
extended to venues traditionally open to a variety of viewpoints, such 
as government public forums, the U.S. Postal Service, public 
broadcast editorials, publicly funded adversarial advocacy, or public 
university student groups.170  In these traditional “domains of public 
discourse,” the government’s asserted control, even over those 
receiving subsidies or other government benefits, would not allow the 
 
 164 But see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972) (holding that a public 
university could not deny school affiliation to a student group because the school 
found “the views expressed by [the] group to be abhorrent”). 
 165 But see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (recognizing that a university 
is a “traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our 
society” that First Amendment freedoms limit the government’s ability to constrain 
speech); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that the First 
Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom”). 
 166 But see Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 531, 533, 547–49 (2001) 
(invalidating a funding condition that prohibited attorney recipients from 
addressing the validity of welfare laws). 
 167 But see Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2321, 2332 (2013) (invalidating a funding condition requiring affirmation of a belief 
outside the government program’s scope). 
 168 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460 (2009) (No. 07-665). 
 169 Cf. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (“Where the government uses or attempts to 
regulate a particular medium, we have been informed by its accepted usage in 
determining whether a particular restriction on speech is necessary for the 
program’s purposes and limitations.”). 
 170 Cf. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Speech, Subsidies, and Traditions: AID v. AOSI 
and the First Amendment, 2012–13 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 363, 381–88 (highlighting the 
importance of such venues to expressive freedoms).  
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government to dispense with typical First Amendment protections.171  
Instead, only in cases of a historic “baseline,” in which the 
government has traditionally asserted control over the expression at 
issue to accomplish government objectives, could the government 
speech doctrine potentially bar a First Amendment challenge.172 
The Court’s prior holdings attributing speech to the 
government could all be defended under this requirement. The 
government traditionally has, for example, exercised managerial 
control over its employees and those compensated to engage in a 
government-funded enterprise to project certain messages to the 
populace.  The government’s authority to control the expression of 
its employees to ensure the accomplishment of government 
objectives has long been recognized by the judiciary (despite the 
controversy regarding the contemporary boundaries of such 
authority).173  Moreover, public entities have enacted conditions on 
funding allocations since the founding of our nation to ensure the 
achievement of prescribed directives, including in fields such as 
public health.174 
 
 171 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 157–58 (1996) 
(explaining that government funding is not determinative of First Amendment 
protection when the speech is within “the domain of public discourse”).  Dean Post 
envisions identifying public discourse domains through case-by-case “complex and 
contextual normative judgments” regarding social characterization, instead of a 
traditional account supplemented by contemporary imputation insights considering 
communicative utility and available alternative channels.  See id. at 152.  Although his 
account offers additional flexibility and contextual nuance, the results should not 
differ significantly, as American historical traditions and contemporary insights 
presumably would often encompass the relevant social characterizations. 
 172 Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359–63 (1984) (discussing the use of history as 
a baseline in ascertaining allocation sanctions). 
 173 See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892) 
(Holmes, J.) (holding that the government may constitutionally impose reasonable 
conditions on its employees, including preventing police officers from soliciting 
money for or being a member of a political committee).  While McAuliffe’s broad 
dictum that a government employee “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, 
but he has no constitutional right to be a [public employee]” has been disavowed, see 
generally O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–17 (1996), 
the government still retains the authority to regulate employee speech to ensure the 
efficient promotion of its public mission.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422–
23 (2006).  For commentary on public employee speech rights, see Helen Norton, 
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its 
Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Free 
Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1173 (2007); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008); George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech 
in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129 (2008). 
 174 See, e.g., Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, 1 Stat. 605 (July 16, 
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The funding conditions challenged in Rust v. Sullivan thus fell 
within a longstanding tradition authorizing the government to 
ascertain the scope of publicly funded health projects, at least to the 
extent the family planning projects were limited to preconception 
counseling (rather than post-conception services).175  The more 
difficult issue in Rust involved the extension of the regulations to 
prohibit physicians in the project from delivering abortion-related 
advice, even upon specific request.176  Although government funding 
for specifically defined public health services extends back to before 
the Revolution,177 there is no indication that such programs ever 
limited physicians’ advice to patients.  Moreover, in light of the 
nature of the physician-patient relationship and the practical 
obstacles to alternative communicative channels, attributing 
physicians’ speech to the government appears problematic.  Yet Rust 
did respond to some of these concerns.  The Court reasoned that the 
regulations did not “significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient 
relationship” because the patient had no justifiable expectation of 
receiving comprehensive medical advice in light of the limited nature 
of the program.178  The regulations also only precluded abortion 
counseling as a method of family planning, thereby allowing abortion 
referral or counseling when medically necessary.179  Other avenues to 
disseminate the message existed, as the health care organization 
receiving the funds could still provide abortion counseling and even 
abortion services—it just had to do so through programs separate 
and independent from the funded project.180  The Court therefore 
held (while leaving open the potential of a different result for more 
significant intrusions on physicians’ advice) that the government was 
free to bar funding recipients from counseling abortion and to 
convey its own undistorted message preferring childbirth. 
 
1798) (establishing tax on seamen entering into American ports to be used by the 
President to provide for temporary relief of sick or disabled seamen either at existing 
marine hospitals or “in such other manner as he shall direct” and under his “general 
instructions”).  In smaller communities, the “hospital” consisted of contracted local 
physicians working in private boarding residences, who were obligated to abide by 
the program’s “instructions” regarding qualifying seamen, permissible stay lengths, 
and treatable conditions.  See Gautham Rao, Sailors’ Health and National Wealth, 9 
Common-place (Oct. 2008) (available at http:// http://www.common-place.org/vol-
09/no-01/rao/www/common-place.org/vol-09/no-01/). 
 175 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179–80, 192–200 (1991). 
 176 Id. at 180. 
 177 See STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL A. LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE 
WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 47–48 (1993). 
 178 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
 179 Id. at 195. 
 180 Id. at 196. 
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The government likewise may engage in promotional advertising 
to serve public interests.  A longstanding tradition supports 
government advertising; indeed, the success of national government 
bond sales made through newspaper advertisements during the Civil 
War has been credited with exhibiting advertising’s power, which 
launched other national ad campaigns and eventually the advertising 
industry.181  Many government-sponsored advertisement campaigns 
have become iconic, including Uncle Sam’s “I Want You for U.S. 
Army” and Smokey the Bear’s “Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires.”182  
Historical traditions thus underlie the Court’s holding in Johanns v. 
Livestock Marketing Association that the government can direct a 
promotional advertising campaign (there, promoting beef 
consumption) to further objectives believed to be in the public 
interest.183  The debatable aspect of Johanns is whether the 
government must be transparent in its involvement—rather than 
attributing the advertisements to “America’s Beef Producers”—to 
ensure the government’s accountability for the message.184  But there 
is little doubt that the government, as a general matter, can use tax 
dollars from its citizens (or from some portion of its citizens) to fund 
promotional advertisements supporting objectives believed to be in 
the public interest (even over the contrary views of taxed objectors) 
under both historical traditions and contemporary attribution 
principles. 
Of course, a traditions-based approach supplemented with 
attribution considerations will not always generate untroublesome 
solutions.  Properly identifying the relevant tradition often is not a 
simple task.  For instance, in a public university setting, different 
relevant traditions exist.  Government viewpoint discrimination 
 
 181 See CHARLES A. GOODRUM & HELEN DALRYMPLE, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE 
FIRST TWO HUNDRED YEARS 35 (2006). 
 182 See id. at 158, 268. 
 183 Johanns v. Livestock, Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–65 (2005). 
 184 Compare id. at 564 n.7 (concluding “no prior practice, no precedent, and no 
authority [exists] for this highly refined elaboration”), with id. at 571 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the government “must make itself politically accountable by 
indicating that the content actually is a government message”).  My preliminary 
research indicates that the majority appears correct in its assertion that there has not 
been a uniform “prior practice” or any precedent requiring governmental 
transparency for its promotional advertisements.  See id. at 564 n.7 (majority 
opinion).  This should not end the matter, though, as such transparency might be 
necessary for correct attribution under contemporary standards.  For persuasive 
arguments that the Court erred by not mandating transparency, see Gia B. Lee, 
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 988 (2005); 
Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. 
L. REV. 587, 597 (2008). 
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regarding student advocacy groups and the pursuit of intellectual 
freedom is taboo,185 but government control over other aspects of the 
university, such as educational content and resource allocation, is 
common.186  A particular expressive undertaking by a university thus 
must be categorized into the appropriate traditional analogue.  And 
such refined classifications will be necessary in other contexts as well 
to discern the appropriate tradition.  Yet this is an inherent difficulty 
in all historical analyses, including those necessary for categorical 
exclusions after Stevens.187 
Another wrinkle is that some government speech situations may 
address relevant “traditions” of relatively recent vintage.  New forms 
or avenues of communication—and potentially government speech—
are constantly emerging.188  Even the longstanding traditions 
discussed previously regarding public universities and government 
advertisements are not traceable to the founding era, as such 
communicative avenues did not exist at that time in their present 
form.  This means that the “tradition” in government speech cases 
may not always be a long one.  If the government creates a new 
particular avenue of communication, the government should be 
allowed to assert control over that forum from its inception and 
preclude contrary viewpoints, assuming that the attribution of the 
speech appears appropriate and the government is not unduly 
abridging valuable communicative outlets.189 
While a full account of the government speech doctrine is not 
feasible here, this overview demonstrates that the existing precedents 
are compatible with a structural framework considering traditions 
and relative worth.  Admittedly, in this context, the framework is 
prescriptive, not merely descriptive.  But the prescription comports 
 
 185 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972); Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 186 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995). 
 187 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–47 (2012) (plurality 
opinion) (finding no historical warrant for a categorical exception from First 
Amendment coverage for false statements despite dissent’s contrary view); Brown v. 
Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735–36 n.3 (2011) (holding historical 
traditions did not support an exception for violence directed at minors despite 
dissent’s contrary argument). 
 188 See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 899, 900–03 (2010) (highlighting government’s use of emerging expressive 
technologies). 
 189 Cf. Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement 
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 111–18 
(2004) (contending the government should be able to discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint when creating a “special public purpose forum”). 
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with the Supreme Court’s holdings and the considerations frequently 
employed to resolve such cases.  And such a framework brings 
symmetry to the Court’s treatment of both categorical and 
attributional exclusions to First Amendment coverage.  No persuasive 
justification exists for a more stringent approach for categorical 
exclusions when imputed exclusions often allow the government to 
violate the cardinal principle against viewpoint discrimination.190  As a 
result, both exceptions to the presumption of First Amendment 
coverage for linguistic communications depend on traditions and 
contemporary valuations. 
 
B. Coverage Presumptions for Nonlinguistic Expressive Conduct 
The remaining issue is ascertaining First Amendment coverage 
for those forms of conduct or action that are nonlinguistic in nature 
yet nevertheless may convey some message.  The Court has long 
recognized that some forms of conduct must be within the scope of 
the First Amendment,191 even though lesser protection is afforded to 
expressive conduct’s nonspeech aspects.192  Yet the Court has never 
proposed “a fully satisfactory test for demarcating speech from 
noncommunicative conduct.”193  The dilemma is defining when the 
“kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes” 
burgeons sufficiently “to bring the activity within the protection of 
the First Amendment.”194  The Court has vacillated on the basic issue 
of whether the conduct must convey a particularized message, 
holding a particularized message is necessary for speech coverage in 
 
 190 Compare Blocher, supra note 54, at 717 (discussing “the many ways in which 
government speech [often] discriminates against private viewpoints”), with R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate . . . 
based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”). 
 191 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931) (invalidating statute 
criminalizing displaying a red flag to oppose organized government on free speech 
grounds). 
 192 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (assuming burning 
a draft card was “sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not 
necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally 
protected activity”). 
 193 Tiersma, supra note 12, at 1531; accord Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 
2005–06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 241  (“The Court has never had a satisfying theory 
of what conduct should get free-speech protection.”); James M. McGoldrick, Jr., 
Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2008) 
(recognizing the difficulty in ascertaining “why some expressive conduct is speech 
and why other expressive conduct is not”). 
 194 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
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some situations,195 but not in others.196  Yet instead of confronting 
these discrepancies, the Court typically ignores them.197 
This reticence is unnecessary, though, because the Court’s 
holdings are reconcilable.  The key, again, is historical traditions.  For 
conduct that has been viewed as predominantly expressive since the 
founding, the Court applies the First Amendment regardless of the 
conveyance of a particularized message.198  On the other hand, for 
contemporary nonlinguistic communicative acts and those involving 
conduct which is expressive only in certain circumstances, the Court 
undertakes a more searching evaluation requiring an understandable 
message.199 
1.  Presumptive Coverage for Traditional Forms 
Some forms of conduct have been understood to be exclusively 
or at least predominantly expressive and within the ambit of speech 
and press guarantees since the birth of our nation.  Parades, marches, 
music, art, monuments, certain displays of symbols, and even 
campaign contributions were protected means of conveying ideas, 
emotions, messages, and political beliefs at the founding.  With 
respect to these predominantly expressive traditional forms, the 
Supreme Court has never required a particularized message for First 
Amendment coverage. 
Marches, parades, processions, demonstrations, festivals, and 
other public gatherings for political and civic purposes were frequent 
events from the earliest days of America.200  Such events often 
 
 195 See, e.g., Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) 
(concluding that “the act of voting symbolizes nothing”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–66 (2006) (holding conduct of 
excluding or affording differential treatment to military recruiters not inherently 
expressive). 
 196 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476–77 (2009) (holding 
acceptance of donated monuments expressive even though “it frequently is not 
possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure”); 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (determining that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition 
of constitutional protection”). 
 197 Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1767. 
 198 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 199 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 200 See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
543, 554–61 (2009) (discussing centrality of such public gatherings to founding-era 
democratic politics); SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND POLITICS OF THE STREET: FESTIVE 
CULTURE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 2 (1997) (highlighting the 
“extraordinarily diverse array” of parades and festivals in early America); MARY P. 
RYAN, CIVIC WARS: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC LIFE IN THE AMERICAN CITY DURING THE 
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included music, songs, flags, effigies, and other symbols to represent 
allegiances and sympathies.201  These parades and marches were 
neither prohibited nor regulated during the founding era, unless 
degenerating sufficiently to implicate criminal law prohibitions 
against breaching the peace, public disturbance, public nuisance, 
libel, or slander.202 
Modern Supreme Court decisions all recognize that parading 
and marching are covered by the First Amendment, even if a 
particularized message is not conveyed.203  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. explained that parades are “a 
form of expression, not just motion,” with “the inherent 
expressiveness of marching to make a point” underscoring the 
Court’s longstanding precedent affording constitutional protection 
to protest marches.204  Parades and marches, the Court confirmed, do 
not need to be distilled to a “narrow, succinctly articulable message” 
to qualify for the First Amendment’s shield; constitutional coverage 
exists as long as there is any reason (or a multitude of reasons) for 
the group’s movement over merely reaching a particular 
destination.205 
To support this proposition, Hurley observed that prior 
precedents had extended First Amendment coverage to displaying 
flags and saluting (or refusing to salute) flags, acts which also might 
not convey a succinct and particularized message.206  Like parades and 
marches, displaying, waving, and saluting flags were common forms 
 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 58–131 (1997) (describing numerous nineteenth century 
examples). 
 201 See NEWMAN, supra note 200, at 1–2, 98–99; Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra 
note 24, at 1060–62. 
 202 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 200, at 562; Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra note 
24, at 1067–68. 
 203 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 568–70 (1995) (discussing First Amendment protection for parades and 
marches even if a “narrow, succinctly articulable message” is not present); Gregory v. 
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969) (holding peaceful march to protest segregation 
“falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment”); Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545–46 (1965) (holding peaceful assembly, march, singing, 
and protest against racial segregation protected by speech and assembly guarantees); 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (determining protest march 
with placards and songs “reflect[ed] an exercise of [First Amendment] basic 
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form”). 
 204 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568. 
 205 Id. at 568–69.  The Court continued: “Not many marches, then, are beyond the 
realm of expressive parades, and the South Boston celebration is not one of them,” 
with its cadre of spectators, costumes, flags, banners, music, and floats.  Id. at 569. 
 206 See id. (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 642 (1943); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
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of expression during the founding era.  As the Supreme Court noted 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the act of refusing 
to salute a flag is “an old one, well known to the framers of the Bill of 
Rights.”207  This long-standing history could explain the Court’s 
failure to mention whether First Amendment coverage extended to 
displaying a flag in its first case invalidating a statute on free speech 
grounds, Stromberg v. California.208  Even though Ms. Stromberg’s 
conviction was based on displaying a “red flag” used as “a sign, symbol 
or emblem of opposition to organized government,” the Court never 
discussed the necessary coverage prerequisite for holding flag 
displays protected by freedom of speech.209  Rather, the Court 
apparently viewed this aspect of the First Amendment’s coverage as 
self-evident, which was warranted in light of the longstanding 
historical traditions of our nation.  Other traditional symbols likewise 
have received presumptive First Amendment coverage, including 
students wearing black armbands (a sign of mourning since the 
Revolutionary period210) to oppose a war.211 
The Court has similarly treated First Amendment coverage for 
nonlinguistic arts (such as instrumental music, painting, sculptures, 
and performance dance) as a largely self-evident proposition, 
irrespective of the comprehensibility of any message conveyed.212  
 
 207 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. 
 208 Stromburg, 283 U.S. at 369. 
 209 Id. at 369–70. 
 210 See MARY CABLE, AMERICAN MANNERS AND MORALS 45 (1969).  Since that time, 
black armbands have been used as a symbol of “mourning” in demonstrations and 
protests.  See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions 
of Free Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1101 (1994) (discussing black 
armbands used by IWW picketers). 
 211 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 399 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).  
The Court summarily concluded without analysis that “the wearing of armbands in 
the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially 
disruptive conduct” and was “closely akin to ‘pure speech’” that “is entitled to 
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 212 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474–77 (2009) 
(reasoning the acceptance of a monument is expressive conduct although “it is 
frequently not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or 
structure”); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (discussing the “unquestionably shielded painting 
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form 
of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”); 
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (concluding nude 
dancing as a form of live entertainment “is not without its First Amendment 
protections from official regulation”); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 
(1973) (recognizing that paintings, drawings, and engravings are protected by the 
First Amendment unless falling within an unprotected category of expression); 
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1972) (discussing expressive protections 
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Many of these cases have highlighted the ancient historical roots of 
such forms of expression.213  The American Revolutionary generation 
viewed expressive guarantees as protecting the “arts in general,”214 
and one of the earliest American state court cases regarding 
constitutional expressive freedoms equated the protections afforded 
to paintings to that afforded to books.215  The arts have thus been 
included in the American conception of free expression since our 
beginnings. 
Even First Amendment coverage for campaign contributions 
comports with founding historical traditions, as contributions to 
campaigns and political parties have been a part of the American 
political system since our nation’s creation.216  The first congressional 
attempts to regulate contributions made through “assessments” on 
government employees were defeated in the first part of the 
nineteenth century, with opponents primarily arguing that the 
proposed bills violated the First Amendment.217  The Supreme Court 
eventually confirmed that campaign contributions are covered by the 
 
afforded to a “scantily clad ballet troupe”). 
 213 See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 470–72 (discussing ancient history of 
communication through monuments); Ward, 491 U.S. at 790 (“Music is one of the 
oldest forms of human expression.”). Cf. Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 
1089–90 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring) (tracing public 
performances by erotic dancers to ancient Greeks), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 214 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774). 
 215 Brandreth v. Lane, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26–27 (N.Y Ch. 1839) (concluding liberty of 
the press applied to both an earlier case involving a painting and the case before it 
involving a book because both situations were “of the like nature”). 
 216 See Robert E. Mutch, The First Federal Campaign Finance Bills, 14 J. POL’Y HIST. 30, 
30–45 (2002).  At the founding, the societal-elite candidate, his relatives, and his 
friends paid the expenses incurred in seeking elective office.  Id. at 39.  But the early 
nineteenth century witnessed a transition from this colonial political remnant to a 
more democratic system, which necessitated campaign contributions on a broader 
scale.  Id. at 30.  Early nineteenth century campaign contributions were first made by 
party members before a practice began around 1830 to “assess” the salaries of 
government employees for the support of their party’s political affairs.  See id. at 30, 
45. 
 217 See id.  Congress considered several proposed bills between 1837 and 1841 to 
prohibit assessments for political purposes on public employees, but none passed, 
with opponents consistently contending that prohibiting campaign contributions 
violated freedom of speech.  See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 25th CONG., 3d sess., Appendix 
157 (1839) (statement of Rep. Isaac Crary) (“It is a bill to circumscribe freedom of 
speech and action. . . . it violates the constitution.”); id. at 204 (statement of Sen. 
James Buchanan) (“This bill is a gag law. . . . The Constitution, in language so plain 
as to leave no room for misconstruction, declares that, ‘Congress shall make no law 
abridging the freedom of speech.’”).  After the Civil War, however, the assessment 
practice was outlawed by federal legislation.  See, e.g., Pendleton Civil Service Reform 
Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
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First Amendment without mentioning the need for a particularized 
or specific message, similar to its treatment of all the other forms of 
traditionally expressive conduct traceable to the founding.218 
The Court’s holdings thus confirm the centrality of historical 
traditions to First Amendment coverage for intended expressive acts 
(even when these traditions go unmentioned in the opinions).  
Consider the contrast between coverage for campaign contributions 
and the lack of coverage for legislative votes.  Carrigan explained that 
a legislative vote “symbolizes nothing.  It discloses . . . that the 
legislator wishes (for whatever reason) that the proposition on the 
floor be adopted, [but it] is [not] an act of communication.”219  The 
Court illustrated with colorful examples: how does a legislator 
through a vote convey whether his or her position is based on 
personal views, the views of constituents, the views of big contributors, 
or the views of the party?220  Yet these exact same arguments could be 
marshaled against the lack of an expressive element in campaign 
contributions.  A campaign donor may make the contribution for a 
number of reasons, including overall support of the candidate, the 
candidate’s view on a single issue, a desire to “buy influence” over the 
candidate, a personal friendship with the candidate, pressure from 
family, peer groups, the workplace, or a spiritual community, the 
urging of a celebrity or media personality, or a host of other potential 
reasons.  The contribution itself “symbolizes nothing” other than the 
individual “wishes (for whatever reason)” to give money to the 
candidate—it does not even indicate that the individual desires the 
candidate’s election, as some individuals contribute to opposing 
campaigns.221  Yet the longstanding tradition of viewing contributions 
to political campaigns as falling within the First Amendment’s 
coverage obviates the need to establish that the particularized 
message the Court deemed necessary for legislative voting exists in 
 
 218 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“A contribution serves as a general 
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the 
underlying basis for the support.”). 
 219 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011). 
 220 See id. 
 221 See, e.g., Ali Weinberg, All Politics is Local: Colbert Busch Culls GOP Support from 
Friends, FIRSTREAD ON NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 21, 2013) available at: 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/news/2013/03/21/17403589-all-politics-is-local 
-colbert-busch-culls-gop-support-from-friends?lite (discussing contributions to 
opposing candidates for same office).  It is also not uncommon in Texas for lawyers 
or firms to contribute to opposing candidates in contested partisan state judicial 
races. See CHARLES W. “ROCKY” RHODES, THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION IN STATE AND 
NATION: COMPARATIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 130-34 
(2014). 
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the campaign contribution context.  Without such a tradition, 
though, establishing that actions in a nonlinguistic form are within 
the First Amendment’s scope is a more formidable task. 
2.  Lesser Coverage for Nontraditional Forms 
With respect to actions without a historical expressive pedigree 
or that are only expressive under certain circumstances, the Court 
has indicated that First Amendment coverage depends on whether 
the conduct at issue is “inherently expressive,” demanding a more 
particularized message without the aid of explanatory speech.222  This 
requires more than merely an intent to convey a message,223 and more 
than engaging in conduct containing some “kernel of expression.”224  
Rather, the conduct must be of a type that contemporary social 
norms recognize as articulating an apparent message that can be 
understood by observers. 
The vast majority of our daily actions do not satisfy this standard.  
For instance, a gathering at a commercial establishment to engage in 
social recreational dancing is not covered by the First Amendment.225  
The differential treatment of military recruiters by law schools is also 
not sufficiently expressive for First Amendment coverage because an 
observer, according to the Court, could not ascertain (at least without 
the aid of explanatory speech) whether such an action resulted from 
disapproval of the military, the preferences of military recruiters, or 
the capacity of the interview rooms at the law school.226  The Court 
has also indicated numerous other activities fall outside the First 
Amendment’s coverage, such as refusing to pay income taxes as an 
expression of disapproval of the IRS,227 being in a state of nudity,228 
 
 222 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 66 (2006) (holding First Amendment coverage extends “only to conduct that is 
inherently expressive” and viewing need for “explanatory speech” as “strong 
evidence” against satisfying this standard); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 
(1989) (concluding First Amendment coverage for conduct depends on the intent 
“to convey a particularized message” and the likelihood that observers would 
understand the message); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) 
(same). 
 223 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the 
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever 
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”). 
 224 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find some 
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes . . . but such a 
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 225 Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 25. 
 226 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66. 
 227 Id. 
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committing assaults or acts of violence,229 using drugs,230 meeting with 
friends at the mall,231 or walking down the street.232 
Yet sometimes this demanding standard is satisfied.  Several 
cases have either held or assumed that burning a recognized symbol 
is covered by the First Amendment.  Burning an item is a potential 
method to express a succinct, articulable message—indeed, the 
founding period was replete with instances of burning symbols (such 
as effigies, flags, publications, or copies of laws) as a means of 
expression.233  But burning an item, unlike displaying a flag or 
marching in a parade, is not a predominantly expressive activity.  In 
most instances, burning is simply a method to generate heat or 
dispose of a worn or discarded item.  As a result, burning is only 
expressive conduct when performed with an intent to convey a 
message that is likely to be understood by observers.234  This standard 
has been satisfied in cases like Texas v. Johnson, which held that flag 
burning as part of a political demonstration merited First 
Amendment coverage because its expressive nature was “both 
intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.”235  Similarly, Virginia v. 
Black acknowledged the First Amendment covers burning a cross, “an 
effective and dramatic manner” of conveying a message of hate.236  
And the Court has also assumed that burning a draft card on the 
steps of a federal courthouse implicated First Amendment coverage, 
an assumption which appears inevitable in light of the clear intent to 
convey a particularized message against the draft that was likely to be 
understood (and indeed was) by onlookers.237 
Other uses of symbols likewise fall within the First Amendment’s 
scope.  Spence v. Washington extended First Amendment coverage to 
the display of a flag with a peace sign affixed by removable tape, with 
the Court reasoning that the combined symbolism was readily 
understandable in light of recent national and world events.238  In 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court assumed 
 
 228 See City of Erie v. Pap’s AM, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 229 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). 
 230 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 231 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra note 24, at 1060–62. 
 234 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989). 
 235 Id.. at 406; accord United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990). 
 236 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
 237 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 238 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
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(without holding) that overnight sleeping in connection with a 
demonstration to call attention to the plight of the homeless was 
covered, at least to some extent, by the First Amendment.239  These 
cases illustrate that First Amendment coverage typically extends to 
those actions involving symbols that have acquired a well-understood 
social meaning in contemporary society, even when the action is not 
predominantly expressive or the symbol is of recent origin. 
The Court has also afforded First Amendment coverage to 
predominantly expressive contemporary activities comparable to 
traditional forms, such as picketing or sit-ins.  Neither picketing nor 
sit-ins—both of which involve congregating in a defined geographic 
space to induce action by a targeted individual or entity—implicated 
expressive freedoms at the founding.240  Indeed, until almost the 
middle of the twentieth century, such concerted actions often 
violated common law or statutory prohibitions.241  Only in 1940 did 
the Supreme Court first afford constitutional protection to peaceful 
labor picketing, viewing it as a “practical, effective means” to 
“enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute,” an 
undertaking “essential to the securing of an informed and educated 
public opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern.”242  
The Court analogized engaging in expressive conduct at a public 
locale near the employer to the historical use of the streets and 
public spaces for other expressive activities.243  While its subsequent 
decisions have allowed the government to prohibit picketing targeted 
 
 239 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 240 See Joseph Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing 
from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 170, 171–72 (1953) (discussing the two known 
antebellum attempts by striking laborers to patrol their employers’ premises, both of 
which resulted in indictments for conspiracy). 
 241 WILLIAM W. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953 168–69 (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
(discussing prohibitions on picketing and targeted actions during the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth century).  The courts viewed the term “picket” as indicating “a 
militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion.”  Am. Steel Foundries v. 
Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921); accord Edgar A. Jones, Jr., 
Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1953) 
(describing the common law’s disdain for picketing).  Despite some early twentieth 
century state court decisions upholding peaceful picketing when allowed (or at least 
not prohibited) by state statutory provisions, the Supreme Court held in 1921 that 
verbally abusive (even if nonviolent) labor picketing deprived the business owner of 
his property without due process of law, such that the Fourteenth Amendment 
required its proscription.  Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921); see id. at 364–
65 nn.28–31 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing conflicting existing state authorities on 
picketing). 
 242 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). 
 243 Id. at 106. 
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outside the primary participants in a labor dispute,244 the Court 
contemporaneously has extended constitutional coverage to 
picketing or focused protests in numerous other contexts involving 
issues of public concern.245  Such cases recognize that, under 
contemporary social norms and understandings, an organized 
confinement to a defined geographic space may be an equally 
expressive method to convey a public message as a group parade, 
march, or other movement (even though both methods may be 
regulated to prevent noncommunicative harms).246 
First Amendment coverage, then, is not limited to historical 
forms of predominantly expressive conduct, but also includes 
analogous contemporary forms of expressive conduct or modern 
symbolism conveying a particularized message that is likely to be 
 
 244 See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emp. Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (concluding ban on picketing of secondary business imposed “no 
impermissible restriction upon constitutionally protected speech”); Am. Radio Ass’n 
v. Mobile Steamship Ass’n, 419 U.S. 215, 229–30 (1974) (upholding injunction 
against American seamen picketing foreign-flag ships employing foreign crews); Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (holding injunction against 
secondary picketing “carries no unconstitutional abridgement of free speech”); 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1949) (upholding 
injunction against picketing to pressure company to stop selling ice to non-union ice 
peddlers).  The Court in these cases highlighted the coercive nature of picket lines 
when labor discord expands outside the primary labor dispute.  See, e.g., Retail Store, 
447 U.S. at 616; Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498–502.  While labor apparently has a First 
Amendment right to engage in handbilling in the vicinity of a secondary dispute, the 
Court has held that picketing, which it views as mixing communication and conduct, 
may be banned in the same vicinity.  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575–76, 580 (1988). 
 245 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218–19 (2011) (holding First 
Amendment shielded funeral protesters from tort liability for emotional distress 
when picketing at a public place on a matter of public concern); United States v. 
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (holding peaceful picketing on sidewalks around 
Supreme Court grounds covered by  First Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–09 (1982) (holding nonviolent picketing 
supporting boycott of white merchants to obtain equality was a form of First 
Amendment conduct); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459–61 (1980) (holding 
prohibition on all non-labor peaceful picketing on the public streets and sidewalks in 
residential neighborhoods infringed on protected expressive conduct); Police Dep’t 
of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–99 (1972) (concluding ordinance precluding all 
picketing within 150 feet of any school not involved in a labor dispute implicated 
First Amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding First Amendment embraces “appropriate types of action which certainly 
include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and 
reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be”). 
 246 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479–83 (1988) (holding that, although 
public issue picketing on residential streets was covered by the First Amendment, an 
ordinance banning focused picketing in front of a particular residence was a 
constitutional time, place, and manner restriction). 
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understood by observers.  As with the exceptions to presumptive 
constitutional coverage for linguistic communications highlighted 
previously, contemporary perspectives regarding the relative utility of 
the communicative thought conveyed thereby supplement historical 
expressive traditions.  These oft-considered distinct inquiries—
determining when words are not covered by the First Amendment 
and when expressive conduct is—thus share common underpinnings. 
III. THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK 
These shared underpinnings highlight the possibility of 
constructing a unitary structural framework to account for the 
Court’s coverage doctrine.  I will summarize the relevant 
considerations, the resulting framework, and its normative 
underpinnings first before applying it to test cases. 
A. Historical Traditions and Contemporary Communicative Value 
Words are not the sole component of the First Amendment’s 
orbit. Rather, two parallel complications arise: (1) determining when 
the spoken, printed, or written word is not covered by the First 
Amendment; and (2) ascertaining when conduct without the use of 
words is constitutionally covered.247  In resolving these issues, the 
Court’s touchstones are prior judicial acquiescence in historical 
traditions and contemporary judicial insights on the value of the 
speech in relationship to its harm.  Other than the cases in which the 
Court considered the coverage issue sufficiently self-evident to 
proceed via ipse dixit, the Court always highlighted one—and 
frequently both—of these considerations.248  At the very minimum, 
then, these considerations are key tools in ascertaining the First 
Amendment’s scope. 
These two considerations are also capable of constructing a First 
Amendment architecture with systematic, ordered queries for 
adjudicating coverage issues.  Under this structure, easy cases remain 
easy.  While hard cases are still hard, the framework ensures the 
appropriate issues are addressed, in accord with past doctrine, even 
under vexing scenarios. 
The first move is classifying the communicative attempt at issue 
as linguistic or nonlinguistic.  Linguistic communicative efforts 
incorporate alphabetical usages of words or language—whether 
 
 247 See Schauer, Categories, supra note 11, at 268–73 (recognizing these two “parallel 
problem[s]” of First Amendment coverage). 
 248 See supra Part II. 
RHODES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:09 PM 
440 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:395 
spoken, printed, written, or otherwise conveyed by audio or visual 
means (including sign language or Morse code).  Such linguistic 
efforts are presumptively covered by the First Amendment. 
There are two exceptions that can rebut this coverage 
presumption for linguistic expression, both of which consider 
traditions and contemporary valuation.  The first exception is so-
called “unprotected” categories of utterances, such as incitement, 
obscenity, fighting words, threats, fraud, and other “historic and 
traditional categories long familiar to the bar.”249  These uncovered 
categories necessitate (1) an ongoing judicial acquiescence in laws 
prohibiting or regulating analogous utterances dating back to the 
founding, and (2) a continued contemporary evaluation that the 
harms associated with that type of utterance exceed its relative 
benefits.250  The second exception concerns expressive efforts 
attributed to the government or polity.251  This exception likewise has 
two elements: (1) an ongoing judicial acquiescence in denying 
expressive coverage to private speakers since the opening of that 
communicative channel, and (2) a continued contemporary 
evaluation that expressive coverage should be attributed to the 
government or polity in light of the communicative interests at stake 
and the availability of alternative communicative channels.252  If 
neither one of these two exceptions applies, the linguistic 
communication falls within the First Amendment.253 
On the other hand, for communicative attempts without 
linguistic elements, only those forms of predominantly 
communicative conduct that the founders considered expressive 
(such as parades, instrumental music, and art) are assumed to be 
covered by the First Amendment.254  When the relevant form of 
 
 249 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2010) (quoting Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 250 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 251 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 252 See id. 
 253 Some dispute exists regarding whether these exceptions in fact predominate 
over the rule. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 14, at 665–66.  As Professor Weinstein 
correctly notes, the Supreme Court’s prior enumerations of the unprotected 
categories of speech do not appear to cover all the linguistic expression outside the 
purview of the First Amendment.  See id.  But even accepting that there are additional 
uncovered forms of expression, I still believe that substantially more linguistic 
expression is covered than uncovered.  I do not have empirical support for this belief 
but can offer a thought experiment: is most of your own linguistic expression subject 
to government regulation without implicating the First Amendment? 
 254 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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conduct is of more recent origin, or involves an activity (such as 
burning) that in most instances is not expressive, First Amendment 
coverage necessitates that the undertaken conduct is inherently 
expressive enough to convey a particularized message without the aid 
of explanatory speech.255  Those nonlinguistic communications 
satisfying either the historical traditions or inherent expressiveness 
standards are then subject to the same exceptions that exist for 
linguistic communications—that is, historical categorical exclusions 
and governmental attribution.256 
This means that historical considerations and communicative 
utility are the dispositive considerations for both linguistic and 
nonlinguistic categorizations.  The purpose of the 
linguistic/nonlinguistic classification is not to dispense with these 
concerns, but rather to establish the coverage presumption 
employed.  Linguistic communications enjoy presumptive First 
Amendment coverage unless excluded by both expressive traditions 
and relative valuation. In other words (borrowed from Professor 
Schauer), the Court adopts a broad coverage presumption for 
linguistic communications and then “defines out” those subcategories 
of utterances with an ongoing tradition of exclusion.257  With respect 
to nonlinguistic communicative efforts, however, the Court “defines 
in” First Amendment coverage for conduct based on either its 
traditional or inherent expressiveness. 
These converse presumptions allocate the risks of overinclusion 
and underinclusion in defining the First Amendment’s scope.  A 
broad coverage presumption that defines out specified subcategories 
tends to avoid errors of underinclusion.258  This appears preferable 
with respect to linguistic communications, which, as discussed earlier, 
are the foremost concern of the expressive constitutional guarantees 
under textual, historical, and doctrinal modalities.259  Affording First 
Amendment coverage to some words that should not be covered is a 
tolerable risk; the danger is failing to afford protection to words that 
should be covered, a threat which chills free expression and 
squelches the breathing room necessary for its survival.  The Court’s 
doctrinal presumption in favor of linguistic coverage therefore 
 
 255 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 256 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–80 (2009); Virginia 
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973). 
 257 Cf. Schauer, Categories, supra note 11, at 280 (distinguishing between “defining 
out” and “defining in” categorizations). 
 258 Id. at 281. 
 259 See supra Part II. 
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appears appropriate. 
The use of the contrary presumption for nonlinguistic acts also 
appears preferable due to the dangers from overincluding conduct as 
covered expression.  Although most activities contain some “kernel of 
expression,” not every action can implicate the First Amendment, at 
least not without either significantly diluting First Amendment 
protections or prohibiting government regulation of a wide swath of 
activities.260  As a result, the Court has been cautious in extending 
First Amendment coverage to nonlinguistic conduct, especially in the 
absence of a historical expressive pedigree.261  The Court thus 
appropriately employs historical traditions and expressive value to 
“define in” coverage for nonlinguistic communications, while using 
the same factors to “define out” coverage for linguistic 
communications. 
The combined operation of these presumptions ensures that all 
expressive forms (whether linguistic or nonlinguistic) that fell within 
the scope of expressive constitutional guarantees at the founding are 
likewise covered today, irrespective of subsequent ad hoc judgments 
that a particular form is not deserving of continued coverage.  In this 
manner, the First Amendment’s original public meaning, evidenced 
through the legislative practices and judicial holdings at the 
founding, serves as a baseline.  This assures at least the continuation 
of speech coverage existing in 1791, similar to the Court’s recent 
holdings that the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
establishes a minimum baseline for implicating constitutional 
protections for searches and seizures.262  This reliance on historical 
practices reduces the risk that courts may conflate unpopular with 
uncovered speech.263 
Yet while ongoing traditions and contemporary understandings 
thus cannot diminish the First Amendment’s scope, they may (and 
frequently do) occasion its expansion.  Subsequent judicial holdings 
and contemporary insights that additional forms hold relative 
communicative value may justify their inclusion within the First 
Amendment.  We can thereby adhere to the original constitutional 
compact and past experiences while allowing the amplification of 
 
 260 Cf. City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 261 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(assuming—but not holding—that camping in that case merited First Amendment 
coverage). 
 262 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
 263 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the 
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 284 (2009) [hereinafter Stone, Lessons]. 
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expressive liberty as new philosophical and moral understandings are 
integrated into the national consciousness. 
This flexibility, however, sacrifices some predictability, especially 
in cases around the edges.  The contemporary ad hoc valuation of 
the relative benefits and costs of traditionally uncovered expression 
may not be evident.  Even historical traditions are not always clear, as 
well-documented difficulties arise in judicial historiography, 
including the appropriate level of generality to establish the tradition 
and courts’ selectivity bias in examining the historical record.264  
While I cannot resolve these complexities here, perhaps the level of 
generality could be tailored to the tradition’s use, requiring more 
specificity, for example, to exclude speech from coverage than 
necessary for a coverage inclusion.  Selectivity bias might be 
ameliorated to some extent by examining actual historical legislative 
and judicial practices rather than searching for philosophical 
understandings or original intentions.  Of course, these suggestions 
do not cure the potential of manipulation.  Still, applying this 
outlined structure provides more constraint than just naked ad hoc 
balancing. 
B. The Framework’s Application 
The just-described framework can reconcile the apparent 
contradictions highlighted in the beginning of Part I.265  Take the 
dichotomy between First Amendment coverage for campaign 
contributions but not for legislative voting.  While a campaign 
contribution is nonlinguistic, it has been considered predominantly 
expressive since the founding.266  Contributions thus obtain the 
benefit of presumed First Amendment coverage, subject only to 
historical exclusions or governmental attribution, neither of which 
apply.  On the other hand, while a legislative vote is linguistic, the 
presumption for First Amendment coverage is rebutted by attributing 
the speech to the polity, in accord with longstanding traditions and 
continued contemporary insights regarding the expressive value of a 
vote and the ample availability of alternative communicative 
channels.267 
Next consider divergent coverage for the commercial sale of 
 
 264 For classic treatments of these general issues, see A.H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: 
An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 and Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. 
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). 
 265 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 266 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 267 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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interactive violent video games and a law school’s refusal to allow 
military recruiters on campus.  Interactive video games contain 
linguistic elements and therefore obtain presumptive constitutional 
coverage.  Neither coverage exception applies, because no 
longstanding tradition exists in this country of restricting children’s 
access to depictions of violence or attributing the message to the 
government.268  Conversely, a refusal to allow military recruiters on 
campus is nonlinguistic conduct that would require either a founding 
tradition of treating the conduct as expression or apparent 
expressiveness without accompanying explanatory speech.  Because 
no tradition exists of viewing a refusal to allow access as equivalent to 
expression, and such an action is not inherently expressive, the First 
Amendment is not implicated.269 
Other acknowledged but ill-defined First Amendment coverage 
exceptions likewise comport with the outlined structure.  Take, for 
instance, the categorical exception the Court has recognized for 
speech integral to criminal conduct.  Although this category was 
listed in United States v. Stevens as among the “well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem,”270 the uncertainty regarding its contours was apparent in 
United States v. Alvarez, which addressed a constitutional challenge to 
the Stolen Valor Act.271  The government asserted that this Act, which 
criminalized false claims regarding military awards, could be 
sustained under a categorical First Amendment coverage exception 
for false factual statements.  In order to establish a historical tradition 
of exclusion for such factual misrepresentations, the government 
provided several examples of proscriptions on false speech that the 
courts have traditionally upheld, including statutes preventing false 
representations of government authority or impersonating a 
government officer.272  The plurality, though, rejected the 
government’s assertion that these examples established an 
overarching exception for false factual statements, instead suggesting 
that the examples implicated the existing exceptions for fraud and 
for speech integral to criminal conduct.273  Yet the plurality failed to 
 
 268 Cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734–35 (2011).  
 269 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 
64–66 (2006). 
 270 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). 
 271 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 272 Id. at 2544–46 (plurality opinion). 
 273 Id. at 2546. 
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offer any further discussion or even indicate which examples fell 
under which exception, an understandable obfuscation considering 
the Court’s prior precedent on this supposedly “well-defined” 
category.274 
The Court first articulated a coverage exception for speech 
integral to criminal conduct in Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.275  
A union in that case, to induce nonunion retail ice peddlers to join, 
sought agreements from wholesale ice distributors to stop selling ice 
to nonunion peddlers, even though such agreements were illegal 
restraints of trade under state law.276  When Empire refused, the 
union picketed; because union drivers refused to cross the picket 
line, Empire lost eighty-five percent of its business before the 
picketing was enjoined.277  In upholding the injunction, the Court 
held that the activities of the union, including “their powerful 
transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a 
picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their union 
memberships, [and] their publicizing,” all “constituted a single and 
integrated course of conduct” violating state law.278  The Court then 
rejected the contention that constitutional coverage extended “to 
speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a 
valid criminal statute.”279 
Giboney’s scope, though, is susceptible to several potential 
interpretations,280 and the Court’s subsequent applications of this 
exception have not helped.  The Court mentioned that distributing 
and possessing child pornography were “integral part[s]” of the 
illegal conduct of producing such materials in two cases holding child 
pornography outside the First Amendment’s ambit.281  Two other 
 
 274 See id.  Neither the concurrence nor the dissent addressed speech integral to 
criminal conduct.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence employed intermediate scrutiny 
rather than a categorical approach.  Id. at 2551–54 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice 
Alito’s dissent argued for a categorical exception for false factual statements.  Id. at 
2560–62 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 275 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 276 Id. at 492. 
 277 Id. at 492–93. 
 278 Id. at 498. 
 279 Id. 
 280 See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 145, at 1314–22 (discussing eight 
different interpretations of Giboney and rejecting each one). 
 281 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990) (upholding a ban on possessing 
child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (upholding a 
ban on distributing child pornography).  As discussed in Part II.A.1, Ferber’s third (of 
five) considerations in recognizing a categorical exclusion for child pornography was 
that the market for child pornography was “an integral part of the [illegal] 
production of such materials,” with the Court then quoting from Giboney as support.  
RHODES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:09 PM 
446 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:395 
Court decisions held that offers to engage in illegal transactions are 
not covered by the First Amendment, with one relying on Giboney as 
support.282  But that has been the extent of the Court’s prior 
illumination. 
Perhaps more guidance is possible by using the identified 
coverage structure to evaluate the statutes discussed in Alvarez 
criminalizing falsely representing government authority and 
impersonating a government officer.283  As an initial matter, some of 
the statutory proscriptions involve nonlinguistic conduct, such as 
“act[ing]” as a government officer or employee, examples of which 
could include seeking access to a restricted area or flashing a fake 
badge.284  Such acts typically should not even obtain presumptive First 
Amendment coverage—founding historical traditions would not 
support the predominant expressiveness of the conduct, and such 
acts would not be inherently expressive enough in most instances to 
warrant First Amendment coverage.285 
Yet undoubtedly certain aspects of these prohibitions extend to 
presumptively covered expressive conduct or even solely linguistic 
communications, such as claiming, for instance, official government 
authority in a letter or in an oral statement.  Often, though, this 
presumptively covered expression will be part of a larger illicit 
scheme of conduct to obtain unlawful financial benefits, classified 
 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62.  Osborne relied on the speech integral to criminal conduct 
discussion from Ferber as one of its several rationales for holding possession of child 
pornography likewise outside First Amendment coverage.  Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–
10.  For critiques of these decisions, see Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 291 (2001); Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 145, at 1324–26. 
 282 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (holding that, as “[o]ffers 
to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment 
protection” in accord with Giboney, so are “offers to provide or requests to obtain 
child pornography”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 (1973) (holding that a newspaper could be 
prohibited under a sexual discrimination law from publishing help-wanted 
advertisements in sex-designated columns). 
 283 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 709 (prohibiting unauthorized use of the names of several 
listed federal agencies in a manner calculated to convey that the communication has 
official authorization or approval); 18 U.S.C. § 712 (prohibiting using “Federal,” 
“national,” or the “United States” to convey official authorization to collect private 
debts or perform investigative services); 18 U.S.C. § 912 (prohibiting impersonating 
an officer or employee of the United States). 
 284 See 18 U.S.C. § 912. 
 285 Cf. United States v. Alvarez 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2554 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).  Although I agree that some of the proscriptions under the statute 
involve activities outside the First Amendment’s scope, Justice Breyer’s suggestion 
that the statute only reaches “acts of impersonation, not mere speech” is 
overinclusive.  See id. 
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information, or some other outlawed advantage.  These are the 
situations that are encompassed within the speech integral to 
criminal conduct exception, properly understood. 
Giboney’s cited authority reveals that the speech integral to 
criminal conduct exception arose from the earlier “bad tendency” 
doctrine.286  At the founding and into the twentieth century, as 
discussed in Part II.A.1, the judicially accepted bounds of this 
doctrine were quite broad, permitting a ban on any communicative 
attempt with a “bad tendency” to cause crime, disorder, or immoral 
acts.287  Yet due to changing attitudes regarding the value of such 
speech, as well as the chilling effect of government censorship over 
such an extensive realm, the Court retreated from such a blanket 
exception in the mid-twentieth century.288  In its place, the Court 
adopted much narrower categorical exclusions—including one for 
incitement of illegal activity and another for speech integral to 
criminal conduct.289  Because advocacy of illegal activity is covered by 
the First Amendment unless intended and likely to incite imminent 
lawless action,290 a comparable limitation is necessary for the speech 
integral to criminal conduct exception.  Otherwise, the Court’s 
circumscription of incitement would be meaningless, as the 
government could simply criminalize the linguistic communication 
itself as an independent illegal act and then assert that the advocacy 
constituted speech integral to criminal conduct.  The speech integral 
to criminal conduct exception should accordingly require that the 
communication is in furtherance of the speaker’s actual participation 
in a larger scheme or attempted scheme of illegal nonlinguistic 
conduct.  Speech by a participant in the actual or attempted 
commission of a crime has little if any intrinsic value, and the harms 
are substantial, authorizing the government to continue to 
criminalize such speech as it has done since the founding. 
On the other hand, speech that is neither part of an illegal 
scheme nor within another well-recognized category should not be 
removed from First Amendment coverage.  Is there any way, then, 
that the statutory prohibitions against false representations of 
 
 286 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502 (citing, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 
(1915) (upholding conviction for publishing an article that “encourages and incites 
a persistence in what we must assume would be a breach of the state laws against 
indecent exposure”)). 
 287 See CURTIS, supra note 124, at 10–12. 
 288 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23–26 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 289 Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2010) (listing categories). 
 290 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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government authority could be enforced against solely linguistic 
representations not seeking an illegal advantage or causing other 
cognizable harm?  In these (I would imagine rare) circumstances, 
speech representing government authority in communications would 
appear to fall within the other exception to presumptive First 
Amendment coverage, for speech attributed to the government or 
polity.  A false claim of government authority differs from a false 
claim of receipt of a government award or honor—it is the 
representation that the speech is on behalf of the government that 
implicates the speech attributed to the government exception, not 
the mere fact that the speaker is making a misrepresentation.  Just as 
a legislative vote belongs to the constituents rather than the 
legislator, speech on the government’s behalf belongs to the 
government to bestow as it sees fit, not to an individual.291  When a 
person claims to be speaking on the government’s behalf, those 
receiving the communication will reasonably attribute the message to 
the government, like the reasonable observer attributes a monument 
on government property to the government.292  The government has 
the right to control the speech transmitted in its name, which is 
necessary to ensure both that its preferred messages are not distorted 
and that the public trust is not betrayed.293  The judiciary has long 
acquiesced in these venerable prohibitions against impersonations 
and other false representations of official authority.294  Moreover, the 
intrinsic value of falsely representing government authority is 
minimal when balanced against the harmful impact on government 
integrity and citizen confidence.  Prohibiting such false 
representations does not foreclose numerous other avenues of 
communication—the only proscription is that the message cannot 
falsely be attributed to the government. 
The Alvarez plurality thus reached the correct conclusion that 
these statutes fell within other existing First Amendment coverage 
exclusions and accordingly did not evidence a broader exception for 
false factual statements.  Nevertheless, its superficial evaluation belied 
the complexity of the presented questions.  The doctrinal structure I 
have discussed here, on the other hand, establishes a context for 
resolving these difficult issues, ensuring the appropriate questions are 
being considered.  Although I cannot address its application to all 
 
 291 Cf. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–51 (2011). 
 292 Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009). 
 293 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991). 
 294 See, e.g., United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 77–78 (1915) (upholding a 
predecessor statute). 
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potential iterations of speech and speaker coverage issues here, the 
foregoing examples indicate its analytical utility. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RANGE 
This Article has explored the Supreme Court’s doctrine on the 
dimensions of the First Amendment, the initial query in free speech 
cases.  I have omitted subsequent speech issues, examining neither 
the appropriate scrutiny for evaluating the varieties of expression nor 
the application of these standards to ascertain the expression that the 
First Amendment protects (rather than merely covers).  Yet insights 
from this project are nonetheless of some consequence. 
The Supreme Court’s coverage doctrine fundamentally depends 
on prior judicial acquiescence in historical traditions and 
contemporary judicial perceptions of the expression’s relative 
valuation.  At least one of these considerations—and frequently 
both—appeared in the cases in which the Court considered the First 
Amendment’s scope at any length.295  And this was whether the Court 
was determining when word usage was outside the First Amendment’s 
coverage, or when communicative attempts without words fell within 
its coverage.  These historical traditions and contemporary insights 
are the foundations for the described coverage structure, which 
envelops all communicative attempts that were viewed as within 
constitutional expressive guarantees at the founding, plus all 
additional forms recognized since that time holding relative 
communicative value.  The assurance that all traditionally expressive 
forms continue to maintain coverage has normative appeal in 
constraining ad hoc judicial experimentation with the First 
Amendment’s reach.  The framework, though, is not chained to the 
past, but allows the expansion of First Amendment coverage as new 
philosophical and moral understandings emerge. 
Yet acceptance of this structural framework is not necessary to 
infer other lessons from the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
coverage doctrine.  The First Amendment, in addition to its 
cherished allure, has a constitutional function in our democratic 
system to protect expression from government censorship and 
overreaching.  Judicial decisions and legal traditions related to this 
function reveal “our historical commitments and principles” 
necessary to divine the underlying purposes of the expressive 
guarantee.296  My overview at a minimum reveals the key combination 
 
 295 See supra Part II. 
 296 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. 
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of historical understandings and contemporary valuation in the 
judiciary’s demarcation of the First Amendment’s coverage, which 
holds some broader implications for free speech theory.  
One implication is the often overlooked significance of original 
meanings in the First Amendment context.  It is frequently asserted 
that originalism is of minimal value in First Amendment analysis, as 
ascertaining a coherent theory of expression from the founding 
generation is irrealizable, and, in any event, founding views are too 
provincial to govern modern First Amendment controversies.297  And 
certainly these objections are undeniable with respect to employing 
an original meaning theory as the sole determinant of First 
Amendment protection—or even coverage—today.  Yet I have 
illustrated that the original public meaning of expressive protections, 
indicated by founding judicial traditions and laws, is frequently 
viewed by the Supreme Court as a key ingredient in discerning the 
contemporary minimum scope, or baseline, of First Amendment 
coverage.  Because the laws and judicial decisions from early America 
are at least strong evidence (if not determinative) of this minimal 
radius, the original understandings of free expression—as indicated 
by the practices of early American generations—are worth 
examining.298 
Yet the fact that founding practices must be explored, rather 
than seeking to obtain a coherent First Amendment theoretical 
understanding from the framers, highlights the impasse in 
identifying a “metatheory” of the First Amendment.299  The free 
speech practices during the founding and subsequent early American 
generations did not result from a singular theoretical conception, but 
rather from the influences of several different political, 
philosophical, and social strands, including Blackstonian legal 
maxims, Enlightenment philosophy, the English Radical Whig 
 
REV. 617, 618 (2011). 
 297 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 952; Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596 n.27 (1982); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1–17 (1994); Stone, Sex, supra 
note 113, at 1863 n.38; DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 52–62 (2010); 
Wright, supra note 1, at 1221–22. 
 298 For recent examples of an original meaning investigation of First Amendment 
issues, see Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable 
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 12–32 (2011); Eugene 
Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 250–59 (2010); Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression, supra note 
24, at 1057–63. 
 299 Cf. Tribe, supra note 145, at 238 (comparing “wholly satisfying free speech 
theories” to “unicorns” that “evidently do not exist”). 
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tradition, revolutionary upheavals, and American conceptions of 
popular sovereignty and republican government.300  These various 
strands, even though never coalescing into a coherent theory, 
influenced legal traditions and practices that allowed, at least for the 
times, substantial expressive freedoms.301  As these historical practices 
influence the Supreme Court’s modern coverage doctrine, a 
contemporary unifying theory has to integrate these traditional 
commitments, even with their multifarious origins. 
A further complication to a satisfactory substantive theory is that 
the expansion in expressive coverage since the founding has not 
arisen from a common underpinning, but rather in response to 
various national and local episodes challenging our commitments to 
and understandings of the First Amendment.  The intersection of 
judicial, political, media, and public responses to some of these 
consequential episodes—including the Sedition Act controversy, 
antebellum abolitionist speech, labor protests, war dissent, the Red 
Scare, and civil rights protests—have had profound influence on the 
dimensions of the First Amendment.302  As Professor Stone has 
suggested, these crises and other American experiences have led to a 
modern First Amendment doctrine that “is largely the product of 
practical experience rather than philosophical reasoning.”303 
The import of these practical experiences has been debated, not 
just within the judiciary, but also among the political branches, the 
media, dissidents, public interest groups, litigants, the public at large, 
and the academy.  The participants in these debates, despite their 
 
 300 See David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of 
Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 821–54 (1985) (describing 
influences on the founding generation). 
 301 See id. at 799–800; accord LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 123, at xvi–xvii 
(expressing surprise at the relatively liberal press freedoms at the founding in the 
absence of a theoretical justification). 
 302 For noteworthy books recounting these episodes and their impact on free 
speech principles, see CURTIS, supra note 124 (focusing on antebellum free speech 
controversies regarding the Sedition Act, abolition, and the Civil War); DAVID M. 
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–1920 (Cambridge University 
Press 1990) (detailing free speech disputes between 1870-1920 involving labor issues, 
political issues, electoral reform, sexual radicalism, and advertising that were 
addressed by judges, law professors, government officials, activists, philosophers, and 
the general public); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004) (discussing 
political, judicial, public, and dissident reactions to American wartime speech 
restrictions). 
 303 Stone, Lessons, supra note 263, at 276–78; accord Vincent Blasi, The Pathological 
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 460–62 (1985) (describing 
First Amendment commitments being formed through “political experience” 
gradually leading to new understandings). 
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disparate conceptions of the First Amendment, have all influenced 
our free expressive traditions.304  Our traditions thus encapsulate a 
multitude of views on the substantive underpinnings of expressive 
freedom. Participatory democracy and self-government,305 public 
constraints on institutional government,306 the marketplace of ideas 
and search for truth and knowledge,307 individual self-realization and 
autonomy,308 and other conceptions have all been integrated to some 
extent.309  A “generous range” of values underlies the First 
Amendment, as indicated by the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal 
to confine expressive freedom to a singular, or even predominant, 
conception.310 
But I do not mean to suggest that identifying “the bundle of 
interrelated principles”311 or the “hierarchy of values”312 undergirding 
 
 304 Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 1, at 1788. 
 305 See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 255 (contending First Amendment produces an informed and responsible 
democratic electorate through both political and non-political communications); 
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482–83 (2011) 
(highlighting First Amendment “value of democratic self-governance,” which 
encompasses the “necessary and proper means of participating in the formation of 
public opinion”); Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 14, at 491 (urging 
primary speech justification is opportunity “for individuals to participate in the 
speech by which we govern ourselves”).  This listing is not intended to imply 
agreement among these scholars.  See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual 
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1114–19 (1993). 
 306 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44 (contending First Amendment is valuable in part as a 
check on official abuse of power). 
 307 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (urging that First Amendment furthers “the best test of truth,” which is 
acceptance of the thought “in the competition of the marketplace”); William P. 
Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 38–39 (1995) (explaining that the “search for the truth suggests that what is 
valuable in human conduct is more than only the political” and more “than pursuing 
self-interest,” but includes the “ability to freely choose . . . ideas and beliefs and that 
beliefs and ideas have value”). 
 308 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. REV. 964, 992 (1978) (contending speech is important to define, develop, or 
express “the self”); Redish, supra note 297, at 594 (urging First Amendment serves a 
single ultimate value of individual self-realization that is broader than Baker’s 
conception); Seana Valentine Shriffin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011) (proposing a thinker-based autonomy theory 
protecting the mind’s free development and operation). 
 309 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 952–59. 
 310 Steven Shriffin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1983). 
 311 Schauer, Categories, supra note 11, at 277. 
 312 James Weinstein, Institutional Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 493, 512 (2007). 
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the First Amendment is unimportant.  Our continued dialectic 
influences—and will continue to influence—judicial, political, media, 
and public attitudes toward the First Amendment.  These attitudes 
help shape the scope of the First Amendment, as the other key factor 
in the Supreme Court’s coverage doctrine is its perspective on the 
value of the underlying speech in relation to its harms.  I have not 
attempted here to adopt a theory (or a combination of theories) for 
the substantive valuation of speech, an undertaking far afield from 
my focus here on the structure of the Court’s coverage doctrine.  But 
I nonetheless recognize the importance of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the First Amendment in giving life to the structure 
I have described.  For now, I must leave this vital issue to our 
continued evolution of First Amendment traditions, which will 
inform expressive coverage for both the speaker and the speech. 
 
